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Introduction
Policy Solutions has a long history of providing international 
audiences with in-depth analyses of Hungarian political life. Thanks 
to the support of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), for the sixth 
time we herewith present an annual review of Hungarian politics. 
This is a comprehensive overview of recent developments, events 
and trends in Hungary in 2019, and an outlook on what topics we 
expect to dominate Hungarian politics in 2020. 
The target audience of this publication is students and academics, 
journalists, diplomats or international organisations. In other 
words, anyone who has an interest in the political, economic 
and social landscape of Hungary in 2019, be it the European 
Parliamentary and the local elections, the state of the Hungarian 
opposition, Hungary’s place in the European Union and beyond, 
the main economic trends or the government’s plans to gain more 
influence over cultural life. It is important to stress that our review 
is not chronological and does not claim to be exhaustive in its scope, 
rather it reflects our selection of the major developments over the 
past twelve months. 
In particular, we focus on five broad areas, presenting distinct 
developments in each. In the first section we review the year 
from the perspective of the Hungarian government, with a special 
emphasis on the impact of the two elections on Viktor Orbán’s 
Fidesz party and the flagship policies of the government. In the 
second section we look at the opposition parties, their state and 
prospects after tasting success at the local elections for the first 
time in more than 10 years. The third section focuses on foreign 
affairs, in particular the place of Fidesz in European politics after 
the EP elections, and Hungary’s foreign policy in a global context. In 
the fourth section, we take a detailed look at how Fidesz’s policies 
have shaped the economy. Finally, some key developments of the 
Hungarian society – media landscape, increasing government 
control over culture and science – are discussed. All of the sections 
conclude with a brief analysis of the issues which may come to the 
fore in 2020.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
.






True to form, the governing party once again dominated the election, 
winning 52.56% of the votes, the second highest share of any party 
in the EU. Fidesz performed slightly better than in the parliamentary 
election in April 2018, and its result was in vein with its previous 
dominance in EP elections, where it tends to dominate even more 
strongly than in national parliamentary elections. If the EP election 
made anything clear, it is that one year after the parliamentary 
election Fidesz’s position as the most dominant force by far in 
domestic politics remained stable (see Table 1).
The lesson of the 2019 European Parliamentary elections is the same 
as that of previous years: the country is still split into two roughly 
equal blocks of government and opposition supporters respectively, 
and whatever changes occur in the support of opposition parties 
reflects an intra-opposition redistribution of votes, without affecting 
the aforementioned overall balance.
1.1  Another Fidesz landslide at the 2019 
European elections
Party European political affiliation EP 2019 EP 2014
Fidesz-KDNP EPP 52.56% 51.48%
Democratic Coalition (DK) S&D 16.05% 9.75%
Momentum Renew Europe 9.93% -
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) S&D 6.61% 10.90%
Jobbik NI (Non-attached) 6.34% 14.67%
Our Homeland NI (Non-attached) 3.29% -
Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party 
(MKKP) NI (Non-attached) 2.62% -
Politics Can Be Different (LMP) Greens/EFA 2.18% 5.04%
Table 1. 2019 European Parliamentary election results




Fidesz delivered almost exactly the results projected by the polls, 
with 52% of the final tally. This was three points stronger than in the 
national election last year and marked the third consecutive 50%+ 
showing for Fidesz in an EP election. 
Though one would hardly guess so from the Hungarian figures 
on election night, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was 
one of the losers of the EP election. Yes, the same Orbán whose 
Fidesz party crushed the divided Hungarian opposition once 
again, was finding himself in retreat. To understand why, it is 
necessary to zoom out of the Hungarian context and to look at 
the Hungarian EP election result in the broader setting in which 
it was embedded. 
Loser at the European level
For the first time, Orbán was no longer just competing in Hungary 
but also at the European level, positioning himself as one of the 
prospective leaders – together with the then Italian deputy prime 
minister Matteo Salvini – of a pan-European far-right movement. 
All indications before the elections were that if such a movement 
looked promising, in other words if the far-right could form a large 
enough and politically coherent group in the EP, Orbán would be 
ready to either tell the European People’s Party (EPP) that he would 
only be willing to stay if they included some of the far-right parties, 
or just leave. 
European voters failed to play along with Orbán’s neat script, 
however. This is not to say that the European far-right performed 
awfully, on the contrary, it did rather well on the whole. Their 
impressive results included first-place finishes in three of the EU’s 
four largest member states, the UK, France and Italy. However, 
it was clearly not the breakthrough that was expected on the 
whole. For once, the far-right had mismanaged expectations. 
Most importantly, there was no breakthrough in Germany, where 
Orbán was heavily banking on a successful AfD performance to put 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and her CDU under pressure. Far-right 
results were also below expectations in Spain, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland and the Netherlands. 
In the EP campaign, Fidesz was suspended 
from the EPP
Central as Fidesz’s domestic performance is for Orbán, he had set 
his goals higher for the EP election, and there he was disappointed. 
Since Orbán does not wish to be perceived as far-right, however, 
it was also vital for him to sell his party’s shift to the far-right as 
a scenario where it is not actually Fidesz that is changing. Instead, 
Fidesz argued that the European People’s Party was the one drifting 
to the left, “into George Soros’ ideological orbit”, thus forcing Fidesz 
to leave to save Europe. 
The EPP leadership was desperate to keep the “Fidesz issue” 
out of the European Parliamentary campaign to make sure that 
its electoral efforts would not be tainted by an ugly internal rift 
with the man who had positioned himself as the hero of the anti-
migrant movement across Europe. In spite of this, Fidesz decided 
to launch its EP campaign with a defamatory attack on European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, who is actually also an 
EPP politician. The Fidesz campaign accused Juncker of orchestrating 
mass immigration jointly with Soros. The EPP was still not prepared 
to cut the cord to its most influential Central Eastern European 
member party. The mutually painful compromise was to suspend 
Fidesz instead. Although only a few hours before the decision was 
announced Fidesz vowed never to accept a suspension, it ultimately 
acquiesced into precisely such an outcome, justifying its volte-face 
by arguing that it had been suspended at its own request. 
Intra-opposition redistribution of votes 
Although the Hungarian EP campaign’s main theme was the 
struggle between Fidesz and the European People’s Party, in terms 
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of domestic politics, on election night the big news was the intra-
opposition redistribution of votes. This time, the changes within the 
opposition were massive indeed. In a stunning upset that the polls 
had failed to predict, former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s 
left-liberal Democratic Coalition (DK) moved into the strongest 
position by far among the opposition parties, capturing 16.05% of 
the votes. More shockingly for the establishment, Momentum, a new 
liberal party, which had missed the parliamentary threshold of five 
percent as recently as April 2018, emerged as the second strongest 
opposition party with a result of almost 10%. 
In the meanwhile, the two parties that had been the strongest 
opposition parties for almost a decade now, the Socialist Party 
(MSZP) on the left and Jobbik on the right, spectacularly fell behind. 
Even though most polls had pegged them as continuing to lead the 
opposition at roughly 10-12% a piece, they received only between 
6-7% each, which put a major dent in their claim to lead the opposition. 
DK and Momentum: the winners of the EP 
elections within the opposition
DK’s rise owes to a variety of factors, but part of the story is definitely 
that it has successfully marketed itself as the party that is the most 
intense and bitter opponent (one may call it enemy) of the Orbán 
regime. At this point, none of the other parties would necessarily 
reject some form of this mantle, but DK has been most eager and 
most successful in seizing it, which explains why an increasingly bitter 
and passionately anti-Orbán electorate (especially higher educated, 
older voters in cities, but DK has been expanding its base in all social 
groups) is gravitating towards it. In the particular context of the EP 
election, this general advantage was compounded by the successful 
launching of the political career of Gyurcsány’s wife, Klára Dobrev, 
who led the DK list for the EP, as well as the party’s resolute embrace 
of the idea of a federal Europe, once again in striking contrast to 
Fidesz’s idea of a Europe of nation-states. It must be also stressed 
that the EP elections have low turnout rates and thus parties with an 
extremely committed base (like DK) perform relatively better.  
Momentum’s good performance is also a complex phenomenon, but 
it nevertheless seems to boil down to one key notion: the lack of an 
alternative for many opposition voters, particularly young voters. 
For one, Momentum’s strong performance owes substantially to 
the collapse of green party LMP, which was punished by voters for 
its incessant internal squabbling and its failure to cooperate with 
other opposition parties in key districts, which was identified as one 
of the major reasons behind Fidesz’s renewed two-thirds victory. 
Moreover, MSZP and DK are undesirable alternatives for many young 
voters, classical liberals and dissatisfied conservatives as the parties 
of the “old left”. Jobbik is still too mired in its racist legacy for some, 
while in the eyes of others it has been just lame since the departure 
of its long-time leader Gábor Vona. In all, this left Momentum as the 
default option for a fairly large segment of the opposition electorate. 
More importantly still, Momentum has learned from LMP’s most vital 
mistake and approaches the notion of electoral coordination much 
more openly – which does not stop it from occasionally criticising 
Gyurcsány and highlighting how different they are from the party 
of the controversial former prime minister, and from the “old left” in 
general.
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There is not much to qualify about the overall assessment of the 
Hungarian municipal elections of 13 October 2019. The opposition’s 
clear victory in Budapest – especially Gergely Karácsony winning 
the city’s mayoralty, but the opposition also won the majority 
of its districts and of the city council – and almost half of the 
major urban centres (10 out of the 23 major cities) was the first 
impressive electoral success for the opposition in the nine years 
since Fidesz took power with a supermajority in 2010. After a 
string of massive electoral victories in three national elections, 
three nationally held local elections and two EP elections, for the 
first time the goliath of Hungarian politics finally looks vulnerable. 
In the meanwhile, the utter hopelessness which had permeated 
Fidesz’s opposition has given way to some euphoria. Even if 
many caveats must be kept in mind, the exuberance is justified. 
Fidesz’s electoral dominance across the board in Hungary can no 
longer be taken for granted. Achieving the seemingly impossible 
success of seizing control from Fidesz of the capital and a range 
of major Hungarian urban areas also implies a responsibility for 
the opposition to actually use the opportunities provided by the 
election. 
The opposition’s first major breakthrough 
since 2010 
Among the most crucial aspects of the opposition’s first major 
electoral breakthrough since 2010 is that it was achieved against 
the backdrop of robust economic growth, rising wages and 
record-low unemployment. To be sure, the economic picture 
is much more complicated than the macro statistics let on, but 
nevertheless, ordinarily one would not expect such a shift in the 
public mood at a time when the economy is not in a recession. 
To put it bluntly, there is a lot reserve here for mobilising anti-
government sentiment when the main tenet of the government’s 
popularity, the solid economic climate, takes a turn for the worse. 
The opposition can also derive some hard-earned confidence from 
the fact that by and large the electoral coordination was realised 
smoothly and in a disciplined manner, with visibly less of the usual 
acrimony or public bickering that has consistently accompanied all 
previous efforts at coordination. For the time being, most opposition 
politicians seem to have absorbed the lesson that this is the only 
way forward. Moreover, it is likely that the leaders of the opposition 
now believe that this is also the voters’ expectation, which means 
that those who defect from cooperation are likely to be punished 
by opposition voters. This ought to make it easier for parties to 
swallow bitter pills in the inevitably highly divisive negotiations that 
will accompany the same process before the next parliamentary 
election in 2022.
In rural Hungary, Fidesz retains a 
commanding lead
It must be pointed out that for Fidesz the outcome was tragic only 
when measured against its previous overwhelming dominance 
in all types of municipalities. Simply put, Fidesz has become 
unaccustomed to losing, anywhere, anytime. The governing 
party has not had a popular majority in Budapest for some time 
now, but it skilfully exploited the opposition’s weakness to keep 
on dominating the politics of a city where its popularity was 
shrinking. 
1.2  Local elections in Hungary: 
the first crack in the system
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Municipal elections tend to be merciful terrains for political parties 
because there are usually some redeeming victories out there when 
discussing the results in the media – there are municipalities which 
are unexpectedly won or retained. Thus, even a general sense of 
defeat can be alleviated with a reference to holding one’s own in 
some municipalities. In this specific instance, however, Fidesz’s 
defeat was relative, so much so that under normal conditions of 
competitive rivalry everyone would have seen such a result as mixed. 
The governing party’s own projections of undefeatability and its 
apparent internal conviction that voters could never tire of the good 
they do have magnified the scope of the opposition’s breakthrough. 
But if as a thought experiment one were to bracket the prior 
expectations and look at the election just from the vantage point 
of what they tell us about Fidesz’s electoral hold over Hungary 
right now, the picture is considerably more nuanced. If one were to 
project these results onto a national parliamentary election, it would 
still yield a robust Fidesz majority, albeit far from the two-thirds 
dominance which the governing party enjoys right now. 
Even if one adds up all the seats that can be won in Budapest and all 
the major urban areas where the opposition has a decent chance, it 
is not enough for a majority in parliament. Winning urban Hungary is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the opposition. To win, 
the current opposition must be able to gain a foothold in some areas 
of rural Hungary, and based on the local elections results that still 
looks like a tall order, even in those areas where the “old left” used to 
be competitive. At the moment, winnable rural districts continue to 
remain elusive for the opposition, and with Jobbik’s decline their best 
hope to change this in the near future is also in doubt because none 
of the other opposition parties have any substantial rural presence 
at this point. Even with the success of the opposition in many 
municipalities, Fidesz still has major demographic reserves which are 
sufficient for an electoral victory. 
However, Fidesz cannot ignore that its support has decreased 
in urban areas, especially among the youth and higher educated 
segments of the society. Fidesz now relies on older, lower 
educated and rural voting groups more than ever. An especially 
striking example for these trends are the wealthy Buda districts, 
which had exhibited signs of trending away from Fidesz already 
in the national election last year (the Fidesz incumbents were 
only saved by a divided opposition) but now turned decisively 
(even if they are still swing districts at best). This is one of the 
transformations that would have been inconceivable as recently 
as 2014: it has happened in parallel with Fidesz’s abandonment 
of parts of its traditional intelligentsia and its decision to focus on 
consolidating its support in rural areas and lower educated voters 
in particular. 
Coordination is vital but not enough
The biggest challenge for the opposition is that as essential as it 
is, electoral coordination can carry it only so far – it helps where its 
aggregate support is enough to defeat Fidesz but in and of itself it will 
not be enough in vast tracts of rural Hungary where there is virtually 
no opposition presence and where there is no way for the opposition 
to communicate with voters other than bussing in their very limited 
number of activists from the urban centres and have them canvass 
relentlessly.  
The opposition’s most important asset in this election, the 
successful deployment of electoral coordination and cooperation, is 
not something that can be taken for granted in future elections. At 
the local elections, the stakes were relatively low, since it is easier to 
surrender mayoralties – especially since the winner of the mayoral 
nomination could offer an increased number of municipal council 
seats in exchange – than to do so with promising parliamentary 
seats, and there are a lot fewer of the latter to go around. In the 
municipal election, the national party leaderships could lean heavily 
on local organisations to compromise in order to stay focused on 
the national goal of defeating Fidesz; but in 2022 it will be up to the 
national leaders to compromise and concede coveted opportunities, 
that will be a different ballgame. 
The Hungarian government in 2019
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A similar problem applies to strategically timed defections, as we 
saw	in	the	Western	Hungarian	city	of	Győr,	where	at	the	last	minute	
the local Jobbik pulled out the rug from under the joint opposition 
candidate. This move likely doomed the chances of the opposition 
candidate with the result that she lost by a very slim margin to the 
incumbent mayor, Zsolt Borkai, whose sex and corruption scandal 
rocked the entire national scene in the last week of the campaign 
and likely tilted a number of close races towards the opposition 
while it increased the margins of victory elsewhere. Despite 
the swift action taken by Jobbik’s national organisation, which 
condemned the move and immediately dissolved the party’s local 
chapter, the damage was already done. There is little that any of the 
opposition parties could do to pre-empt similar defections before a 
parliamentary election, where they would hurt a lot more. 
In any conceivable scenario where the opposition is not on the verge 
of a landslide victory but needs to compete hard in many swing 
constituencies to cobble together a parliamentary majority, these 
two factors – the inherent conflicts that coordination engenders and 
defections – constitute major risk factors for a potential opposition 
victory. 
Candidates matter
A piece of good news for the opposition is that candidate selection 
does play a huge role – not as a variable that can override deeply 
ingrained party preferences, but as a factor which can enhance 
voter mobilization and tilt the result among the diminishing share 
of swing voters. The fact that the highly respected media figure 
András Pikó managed to crack the toughest nut in Budapest, the 
eighth district (the only district in Budapest where Fidesz was 
stronger than the entire opposition without Jobbik in the 2018 
election), is a key case in point. On the other side, the impressive 
re-election margin of the Fidesz party elder Zoltán Pokorni – 
widely regarded as a silent internal critic of Fidesz’s current course 
and a non-corrupt politician with personal integrity – despite the 
opposition’s surprising sweep of the traditional Fidesz strongholds 
in the wealthy Buda neighbourhoods is another illustration that 
personal appeal has an impact.
Independent candidate Péter Márky-Zay’s success in the rural town 
of	Hódmezővásárhely,	which	was	one	of	the	most	classic	right-wing	
bastions in Hungary, definitely holds part of the clue to weakening 
Fidesz’s grip on rural Hungary. Thus far, the main elements of his 
success seem to be his independence from parties combined with a 
strong conservatism that is nevertheless tolerant of left and liberal 
views; a high intensity engagement with the public; and a reputation 
for integrity. Although it tried, Fidesz was not able to sell Márky-Zay 
as a liberal traitor who is at odds with the needs of rural Hungary. 
Instead, Márky-Zay appears to have established his conservative 
bona fides and earned the trust of a segment of (probably loosely-
aligned) Fidesz voters, without alienating those to the left of him. 
These elements may not capture the entire story, but they are 
nevertheless key insights for future campaigns in towns similar to 
Hódmezővásárhely,	which	may	be	winnable	despite	 the	 fact	 that	
most of them look elusive for now. 
The Hungarian government in 2019
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In this section, we take a look at the government’s key public policies 
in 2019 and the communication framework they are embedded 
in, keeping in mind that the list is also noteworthy for the glaring 
absences (for example education, health and welfare).
Demography as a flagship policy
In terms of policies, the demographic challenge remains the central 
theme of the government’s communication and the area where 
many of its flagship policies are focused. The “Year of the Family” in 
2018 was followed by the more martial-sounding “Family Protection 
Action Plan” in 2019, which was essentially a continuation of the 
same programme with a different label. 
Money to middle and especially upper-middle class families continues 
to be the core of the various programmes.  Although it has thus far 
failed to produce the anticipated baby boom, the already generous 
housing subsidy programme (named CSOK), which offers several 
years of an average net salary in Hungary to subsidize the home 
ownership of families with three children, recently saw the rule lifted 
that limited the use of the subsidies to newly-built homes, which will 
be a boon to urban-dwelling “ideal” families, for whom new homes 
are often a financial challenge even with the subsidy. 
Even more importantly, another generous program was introduced 
that kicks in already at the first child. The CSOK is now complemented 
with the “Waiting for the Baby” programme, which offers a zero-
interest loan up to 10 million HUF (roughly €30,000), which can be 
claimed by any married couple as long as the mother-to-be is over 18 
and under 40. Unlike the CSOK, which offers 10 million HUF in grants 
and 10 million HUF in loans for three children but is limited to home-
buying, married couples are free to do with the baby-waiting money 
as they please. Moreover, the conditions of repayment are generous: 
the monthly instalment may not exceed 50,000 HUF (€150) and all 
payments are paused for three years when a second child is born 
within three years. Moreover, when a third child arrives (within three 
years of the second), the total debt is entirely forgiven, thus turning 
the loan into another grant. Given the extremely long repayment 
period and the rising rate of inflation, the loan is extremely favourable 
to begin with. So at this point, not counting all the other subsidies 
(such as the massive income tax cut for three children), for three 
children a Hungarian family can receive a total of roughly €100,000 
from the Hungarian state – in a country where the average net salary 
is still about €800 a month, and only a third of this sum needs to be 
repaid. 
Like the CSOK, this loan is also contingent on requirements that are 
meant to pre-empt the eligibility of poorer families, such as three 
years of employment or enrolment in higher education.
Other benefits to urge a baby boom 
The most generous aspect of the “protection plan” was complemented 
by an array of smaller measures, such as the possibility for non-
retired grandparents to claim the Hungarian parental leave if they 
care for their grandchild, subsidies for buying cars, and the permanent 
income tax exemption of mothers with four or more children. More 
importantly, the government has pledged to increase the crèche 
places in Hungary from 50,000 to 70,000. In combination with the 
stubbornly declining birth-rate, a realisation of this figure would bring 
1.3  The issues and policies of the 
Orbán government in 2019
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the government very close to the promise of offering a crèche place 
for every child in Hungary. 
Somewhat problematically, the expansion could run into massive HR 
problems, as educational institutions across the country are already 
finding it difficult to hire teachers, and wages and working conditions 
in the sector lag so far behind the private sector that save for an 
economic crisis with the concomitant mass layoffs, there just will not 
be enough people to staff the crèches. 
Attempts to save rural life in Hungary
Hungary is also known for its abundance of small municipalities. 
Roughly half of the country’s ca. 3,200 municipalities has a population 
of fewer than 1,000 souls, and many small villages are teetering on 
the edge of demographic and fiscal viability. Lacking infrastructure, 
access to education and healthcare (large swathes of Hungary lack 
access to reasonably close general practitioner services), and often 
jobs, too, make small communities increasingly unattractive places 
to live, especially for young people. 
But rural areas have emerged as the core of Fidesz’s political 
support, and this trend was highlighted even more emphatically by 
the municipal election of October 2019. The overall trend towards 
the opposition not only failed to trickle down to most rural areas, 
but Fidesz in fact managed to improve its results in many of these 
small communities. Sustaining rural life is of vital importance 
for Fidesz, both because of the votes that can be won there and 
because it meshes with their broader ideological outlook and 
the corresponding communication, that is the protection of the 
Hungarian way of life – of which small village life is one traditional 
component. 
Correspondingly, the government has created a much-touted but so 
far modestly funded subsidy scheme called the Hungarian Village 
Programme, which is designed to facilitate life in these communities. 
Grants can be applied for to finance village superintendents, for 
The Hungarian government in 2019
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example, who perform maintenance, as well as trying to improve 
local healthcare services and infrastructure (roads and town hall 
renovations). Yet at roughly 70 billion HUF (€212 million) up to 
August 2019, the amounts disbursed in the forms of grants are 
relatively modest when compared to the government’s massive 
outlays into elite sports, for example (the much-celebrated Puskás 
stadium in Budapest alone cost 200 billion HUF - €606 million). 
While the programme may sound good in terms of communication, 
and the government plans to further increase financial support for 
this programme, the investments are merely a trickle compared to 
the needs of rural communities and they are highly unlikely to turn 
the demographic tide of booming cities and declining rural areas. 
Protection remains the key
As in previous years, the consistent line throughout Fidesz public 
policies and communication is the concept of protection and of halting 
changes, be it in the form of the changing demographic makeup of 
the national and local communities, cultural transformations or the 
global trend towards urbanisation. 
This is of course in keeping in line with the relentless focus on 
migration and the theme of protecting Hungarian society, which has 
served Fidesz exceedingly well electorally since the issue cropped up 
in 2015, at a point when the governing party was at an alarmingly 
low point in the polls. It is also interesting how the particular focus on 
protection has been translated into the language and communication 
of the demographic/family policy (see the “Family Protection Action 
Plan”), something which implies that the concept of family is under 
threat and needs the state’s intervention/protection. 
How potent is the migration issue still?
And even as the migration issue remains a vital focus of the 
government’s propaganda, cropping up in almost every context when 
the opposition is discussed no matter how far removed it might be 
from the issue at hand, Fidesz is obviously struggling at this point to 
convince large parts of the public that there is an actual  threat from 
migration. This does not challenge the fundamental hypothesis that 
migration is a powerful issue that can send Hungarians clamouring 
for governmental intervention and for the safety of Viktor Orbán’s 
protection. But as the municipal elections showed, without the acute 
fear of masses of migrants barging in, at least Hungarians in high-
information areas are willing to consider other issues as well, most of 
which do not bode well for the governing party. 
Still, the notion of protection will undoubtedly remain at the core of what 
the government does and especially what it communicates. As Orbán 
knows all too well, however, protection needs a plausible threat, and 
finding one in time for the election of 2022 is Fidesz’s most important 
project at this point. Especially so since a potential economic downturn 
before the next election could erode the most important bastion of the 
governing party’s popularity, its supposed economic competence (also 
built around the theme of protection from foreign interests). 
Increasing conservative influence over 
education 
In 2019, the government also moved to increase conservative 
influence over education. With a supermajority amendment, the 
government has given itself the right to fully control the educational 
activities of independent private schools in Hungary. How the 
government will wield this vast authority over the growing segment 
of independent schools in Hungary (many of which have served as 
refuges for the offspring of Fidesz politicians and intellectuals from 
the underfunding and outdated teaching methodologies that prevail 
at state schools) is still in question, but the players involved have 
every reason to be worried. The Waldorf Schools and many other 
alternative schools remain vulnerable to political pressure. 
This move can be considered as part of a wider backlash against the 
perceived harmful liberalism in many cultural sectors which, according 
to government-aligned politicians and media, has hindered the 
implementation of a grand strategy aimed at national grandeur and 
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development (see Chapter 5 for more details on “culture wars”, here 
we focus only on education). Yet many of these actions have been, 
by all means, at odds with the proclaimed goals. The accumulation 
of human capital was supposedly at the heart of this strategy. 
The new model for higher education has been one of foundations 
directly financed by local businesses which would ostensibly serve as 
partners in training and eventually employing graduates. The model 
for Corvinus University was already being adopted by Széchenyi 
University	in	Győr,	the	second	industrial	city	of	the	country	and	home	
of a major Audi plant. As for the reforms to primary and secondary 
education – notably: centralization and the purging of alternatives 
to government-sanctioned curriculum and books –, they have led to 
devastating results in international comparison. 
The newly published PISA survey on reading comprehension, science 
and math showed a stabilization of subpar levels for Hungarian pupils 
in comparison with their best record dating back to 2009 (before 
the forming of the second Orbán government). The performance 
of Hungarian teens placed them around place 32 in the three 
dimensions out of 79 participating countries. All these results were 
below the OECD average. Hungary also lagged behind all countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, except for Slovakia. 
As for Zoltán Pokorni, a former minister of education in the first Orbán 
government, a former president of the Fidesz party, and a current mayor 
of an affluent district of Budapest, school reform was at the heart 
of underwhelming performance on standardized tests. Vocational 
schools cannot cope with students who did not learn to read and 
make basic calculations in primary school. In his view, the centralized 
state school system should learn from alternative and private schools 
which better prepare their students for a world that puts a premium on 
problem-solving and swift decision-making. Pokorni is by no means 
in the inner circle of current Fidesz decision-making structures, his 
general criticism – also shared by József Pálinkás, his successor as 
education minister in the first Orbán cabinet, and former president of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences – points to the disenchantment in 
conservative milieus with the education policy of recent times. 
Government plans to limit judicial 
independence
Judicial independence as it continues to persist in the ordinary court 
system (i.e. the courts outside the Constitutional Court, which 
interprets the constitution) has been a thorn in Fidesz’s side ever 
since it took power in 2010. The government itself, Fidesz officials 
and their loyal media keep losing many high-profile and sensitive 
cases, including, among other issues, election law disputes, freedom 
of information or libel. These failures have generated a desire to 
speed up the process of controlling the judiciary. The ground for 
one potential route to this end was laid in the seventh amendment 
of the Hungarian constitution, the Fundamental Law, which was 
passed by Parliament in 2018 and provided for the creation of 
administrative courts, which resulted in the subsequent adoption of a 
law that “complied” with this constitutional mandate. However, citing 
international pressure the Orbán government ultimately abandoned 
the plan of establishing administrative courts in 2019, which was 
greeted with relief by NGOs and international organizations. 
The withdrawal of the proposal to set up a parallel judicial system 
through the administrative courts appeared to be the government’s 
most important concession to the rule of law since it took power in 
2010. However, like often before, it quickly emerged that Fidesz had 
only given up on a specific approach without abandoning the overall 
goal of increasing political control over the judiciary in general and 
sensitive judicial decisions in particular. Soon after this decision was 
announced, an omnibus bill was introduced in parliament by the 
Ministry of Justice (and approved by the National Assembly on 10 
December).
The most important of the changes is a legal amendment that 
will effectively undermine the traditional functional separation 
between the Curia and the Constitutional Court and open up 
the possibility of taking cases that were unfavorably decided 
outside the ordinary judicial system and bringing them before the 
Constitutional Court, even if the underlying statute that the case 
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was decided on is deemed to be constitutional. Effectively, in 
certain contexts the Constitutional Court may overrule the Curia 
in cases that previously could not have even legally ended up 
before the Constitutional Court. The prevailing assessment among 
independent NGOs is that unlike the impartial Curia – which is made 
up of career judges, whereas constitutional judges do not need to 
be judges to be elevated to that position – the Constitutional Court 
is heavily biased towards Fidesz. 
It will also become easier to second judges to public administrative 
bodies, such as the State Audit Office, the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, regional government authorities, etc. While this practice 
exists already, its expansion and facilitation will serve to blur the 
lines between the judiciary and the public administration. It is 
worth noting that this harks back to a longstanding effort of the 
government to remove the clear separation between the judiciary 
and the executive branch by allowing public administration officials 
to transition to the judiciary with relative ease, which was a key 
aspect of the since abandoned plan to set up administrative courts.
Introducing the concept of ‘Christian 
freedom’
At the rhetorical level at least, the challenge for Fidesz is the classical 
dilemma between freedom and security, and as the party officially 
remains committed to both, Viktor Orbán has announced the notion 
of “Christian freedom” as the alternative to the classical notion of 
what we know as, well, freedom. Christian freedom appears to be 
to freedom what illiberal democracy is to democracy. 
It would be easy to dismiss Orbán’s new fad as another rhetorical 
ploy, and it is especially tempting to do so given its vague meaning. 
But it would also be a mistake. Given what we have learned about 
Orbán’s illiberal democracy in practice, it is a concept that does 
broadly correspond to how Fareed Zakaria defined the term in 
his famous article two decades ago. By our modern and complex 
understanding of democracy, it is not a democracy at all but 
a transient hybrid that progresses at varying speeds towards 
authoritarianism, where it will likely end up unless it runs into 
massive social resistance. 
While the literary source and hence the meaning of Christian 
freedom is less clear, the prime minister’s intention to bring it about 
should be taken as a given. It is fair to assume that promoting 
Christian freedom will be couched in the language of protection, 
in this case the protection of Christian freedom, because that is 
how Viktor Orbán’s protection racket operates. For Hungarian civil 
society, the challenge is to anticipate and brace itself for how this 
will play out in practice.
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The slew of legislation introduced in the final weeks of the year 
are enough to lay to rest any delusions in the opposition that in 
line with its initial rhetoric following the electoral setback in the 
municipal elections, Fidesz is going to follow a less aggressive tack 
than previously. In fact, the opposite appears to be happening, with 
the governing party pushing through legislation aimed at taking 
away both competences and fiscal latitude from the municipal 
governments, aimed particularly at crippling Budapest’s mayor 
and his majority on the city council, at increasing the government’s 
influence in the judiciary, and changing media and parliamentary 
rules to make the life of independent media and the parliamentary 
opposition more difficult. 
Two ideas in particular are going to shape Fidesz’s thinking. First, 
while it does not necessarily need to win back those regions it lost 
to the opposition in October 2019, it needs to cement its hold over 
the rest of the country. It appears that to the government’s mind a 
conciliatory approach and the implied admission of weakness and of 
previous errors does not help in achieving that goal. Second, as the 
new rules for the future parliament highlight – in particular a lot of 
formal rules that Fidesz adopted to make it far more difficult for the 
opposition to coordinate electorally – Fidesz assumes that the era of 
a two-thirds majority is over for now. That seems reasonable. Had 
the opposition coordinated only a little more in 2018, they could have 
easily stopped the government from attaining the supermajority, 
which is now being wielded to suffocate the opposition and removing 
the few remaining checks and balances (courts and municipalities).
But even if the scope of the opposition’s gains in 2022 fail to measure 
up to the level of their success in the October 2019 municipal 
election, as things stand improved electoral coordination would be 
sufficient to end Fidesz’s current constitutional supermajority. This 
means that the government needs to use its majority in ways that 
lay the ground for a leaner period when it will not have easy recourse 
to major changes to reduce the democratic rights of the opposition 
or to increase its control over public discourse and society in general. 
This creates a major incentive to consider and try to anticipate in 
detail what constitutional and cardinal law amendments Fidesz 
might need after 2022 and to pass these now. What makes this 
especially pressing is that, ideally, doing so should not occur 
immediately before the election, so as to minimise the impact of a 
backlash. Hence, 2020, which is still relatively far from 2022, may 
seem ideal for drastic changes – although none of the above reasons 
should lead us to entertain doubts about Fidesz doing harsh things 
before the election if it perceives that it needs to take drastic action 
to cement its power. It should not be forgotten that Fidesz could 
easily modify the electoral system with its current supermajority in 
Parliament, and several observers already point to the possibility of 
further gerrymandering in Hungary’s 106 electoral districts before 
the next general elections.
Fidesz’s success thus far has been dependent on a combination of 
tilting the playing field by using its powers to cripple the opposition 
legally, financially and through character assassinations carried out 
by a vast media empire; the effective removal of all checks on its 
power; and a robustly growing economy. The first two are still given. 
But as the government knows all too well, the latter is predicated on 
cyclical and global influences, and while Fidesz has lucked out for a 
decade, it cannot necessarily assume that this streak will persist. The 
1.4  Outlook on the Hungarian 
government’s prospects in 2020
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last time the economy lagged temporarily, in the middle of the first 
post-2010 term of Fidesz, the ruling party slumped massively in the 
polls. 
If an economic slowdown hits before 2022, Fidesz will clearly find that 
it needs to clamp down even harder on anyone who is in a position to 
criticise the government. At the same time, an economic slump will 
also have the impact of bringing into sharper relief those issues that 
Hungarians do manifestly care about – such as the desolate state 
of healthcare and education, as well as growing inequality – but 
not enough to vote against a government that delivers a booming 
economy and keeps migrants out. The threat of lifting the fog of 
economic boons and thereby laying bare the sad reality of Fidesz’s 
failures in the abovementioned areas should presumably inspire the 
government to do something about these, to tackle the obvious crisis 
in these areas so that it has something to sell to the public when 
the economic going gets rough. Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that 
Fidesz will ever find it worthwhile to compete with the opposition by 
delivering better healthcare and education or by reducing inequality 
and alleviating extreme poverty. It would be a pleasant surprise to 
be wrong on this count, but genuine and beneficial reforms in these 
areas are unlikely to be on the agenda for 2020.







The Hungarian municipal election of 2019 was an unprecedented 
political development since Fidesz took power in 2010 and began 
reshaping the entire Hungarian political system to consolidate 
its power. After years of bickering, the opposition parties finally 
managed to coordinate electorally and felt the first taste of a 
major electoral success in a decade. It is clear that Fidesz’s defeat 
in a number of major municipalities has reshaped the Hungarian 
political landscape, it has opened up the possibility of real 
competition, hampered as it must necessarily be under the vastly 
unfair conditions imposed by the government. 
At the same time, the rivalry with Fidesz is only one layer of the 
democratic competition, even if it is the most crucial one. The 
intra-opposition rivalry is promising to be fierce as well, especially 
since the stakes of each parties’ relative position will be more 
significant than at any time before. If there is any likelihood of the 
opposition ousting Fidesz and taking office in 2022, then this will 
involve a lot of power for the winners in terms of shaping the new 
government’s policies, and also in terms of the many positions 
that can be distributed among the parties’ activists. These in 
turn are likely to have a major impact on the long-term viability of 
opposition parties, since as long as the current electoral system 
persists, it will be impossible for minor parties to independently 
gain parliamentary representation that corresponds with their level 
of support in society, while larger parties in turn will be relatively 
overrepresented.
Realignment in the leftwing and liberal 
opposition
Broadly speaking, the local elections of October have reaffirmed 
the new balance of power among the opposition parties, which we 
already saw taking shape in the European Parliamentary election. In 
short, Ferenc Gyurcsány’s Democratic Coalition (DK) and Momentum 
have emerged (or rather have solidified their position) as the leading 
opposition parties, while the Socialist Party (MSZP) and Jobbik have 
stabilised their declining support for now, albeit at lower levels than 
they enjoyed in April 2018. LMP still scrapes the bottom of the barrel 
to mobilize some of its once impressive base, but it is clearly on life 
support without much of a strategy of how to revive itself. 
Most of the swing in the electoral outcomes of the October municipal 
elections (that is the mayoralties and local council seats won by 
the opposition) owed to the opposition’s ability to unite in places 
where it already enjoyed a lead or was close to it, while the overall 
balance in the support of Fidesz and the opposition, respectively, 
was broadly stable before October. Thus, these numbers also 
suggest that DK and Momentum benefit from winning over existing 
opposition voters from other parties rather than expanding the 
base of the opposition altogether. 
An interesting aspect of the current constellation is that to some 
extent DK and Momentum get along better thus far than most 
2.1  New dynamics – the impact of the municipal 
election on the balance of power in the 
Hungarian opposition
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analysts would have expected. Apart from a dose of self-discipline 
on the sides, a major reason is that they cover different voting 
groups of the electoral market. There appear to be few voters who 
are undecided between Momentum and DK. For the time being, 
these two parties have very different bases and they are growing 
slowly enough not to clash over the same types of voters. 
DK and Momentum: different voters, 
different strategies
By and large, the core of DK’s support continues to be made up of 
elderly voters; those left-leaning voters who feel most strongly anti-
Fidesz; and former MSZP voters who are turning away from their 
party and always saw DK as their secondary preference. Momentum, 
for its part, is primarily drawing on young voters and intellectuals (DK, 
too, has a base among intellectuals, but they are almost exclusively 
older). With its nebulous place on the left-right continuum it tries to 
appeal to disaffected green (LMP) voters and moderate rightwingers, 
and it is also fairly successful at establishing itself as the party of 
choice for first-time voters. 
The strategies of the two parties are also distinct in how they 
approach the process of building a base. DK believes that in the 
age of political polarisation a harsh rhetoric and tribalisation is the 
best route forward, and it is building a fierce subculture around 
former prime minister Gyurcsány. DK is the party that is second 
only to Fidesz in the intensity of the loyalty of its supporters, who 
are also vociferously critical of anyone who takes a position against 
Gyurcsány or DK, be it right or leftwing critics. 
DK and its supporters are increasingly establishing themselves 
as the most cohesive block on the opposition spectrum and, 
consequently, the dream that many other opposition politicians 
once harboured about ousting Fidesz without entering into an 
alliance with Gyurcsány seem more elusive than ever. This also 
explains why the former prime minister is almost never mentioned 
by other opposition politicians at this point, even though he was 
a frequent target of rhetorical attacks previously and remains 
so among opposition intellectuals. Momentum is eschewing 
the tribalism of DK and it focuses more strongly on issues such 
as corruption and transparency, quietly expanding its base by 
appearing as a centrist and less shrill but nevertheless staunchly 
anti-Fidesz force. 
Ideological ambiguity
It is also worth exploring where the two parties are similar. Both 
parties are remarkable for how difficult they are to pin down 
ideologically. With Momentum, ideological ambiguity was an openly 
acknowledged and proudly worn label based on the presumption 
that since most Hungarians do not fit neatly on the left-right 
continuum, their party does not have to, either. DK has skirted 
the left-right issues more quietly, but while aligning itself with 
European social democracy in the EP (unlike Momentum, which has 
joined the centrist liberal Renew group), it is basically staking out 
a similarly amorphous position by traditional left-right standards. 
The most recent controversy concerning the party’s decision 
to vote against an EP resolution about the refugee crisis, which 
was supported by most of the left in the EP and ultimately failed 
because of how the four DK MEPs voted, was a potent signal of 
its willingness to appeal to a fundamentally rightwing but widely 
popular sentiment in Hungarian public opinion, which remains 
resolutely anti-immigration. 
The paradox of the Socialist Party: low in the 
polls, high in elected positions
MSZP took hits at the EP elections, but it stabilized its position at the 
local elections, and it is not necessarily down for the count. Vitally, the 
Socialists offer something to the opposition coalition beyond their 
mere voters. In a remarkable paradox, despite its low support in the 
polls and in the elections (wherever citizens could vote for separate 
party lists), the Socialists continue to wield considerable influence 
by having the biggest reserve of experienced officials, elected and 
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appointed, while the other opposition parties sometimes found that 
they have fewer of these than needed, which inevitably gave the 
Socialists greater clout in some municipalities where the opposition 
took over. 
MSZP holds more mayoral seats and has more influence in the 
municipal assemblies and in the town halls than one would have 
expected, and, if properly deployed, these could of course prove 
instrumental in revitalising the party. At the same time, some old 
and new scandals attached to several of these figures also continue 
to weigh down on the party’s public perception, so the reservoir of 
expertise is a double-edged sword. 
A vacuum on the left…
What is most striking about our survey of the opposition is the 
absence of a strong leftwing party. Which, incidentally, brings us to 
one more party that deserves to be discussed in this context. Along 
with MSZP, the only leftwing party with a parliamentary presence 
is Párbeszéd (Dialogue), which had to partner with MSZP in every 
election since last year to either pass the relevant thresholds or to 
win. Arguably, Párbeszéd was the biggest winner of the municipal 
election, since its candidate Gergely Karácsony won the Budapest 
mayoralty, and it also scored some smaller successes, including the 
mayoralty of one of the Fidesz bastions in Budapest, the elite Castle 
district. 
For years, Párbeszéd has suffered from the fact that even though 
several of its leading politicians are popular nationally – Karácsony’s 
surprisingly strong victory in Budapest was a sign – the party itself 
simply fails to climb in the polls. Except for the lack of a national 
organisation – which is clearly a problem for Momentum as well, 
which nevertheless performed better than expected in rural areas 
for a Budapest and youth-centred party – there is no obvious 
explanation for the gap between the popularity of the party’s most 
prominent politicians and the party itself. 
But as it stands, for the time being there is no strong leftwing party 
in Hungary, which suggests that there is an ideological vacuum in 
Hungarian politics because a sizeable minority of Hungarians still 
identify as leftwing and, moreover, on economic issues a majority 
of Hungarians lean left. This is another mystery that cannot be 
easily explained, but Viktor Orbán’s outsize influence on Hungarian 
politics is probably a part of the puzzle. Fidesz defines the terms of 
Hungarian political discourse, and the opposition is to a significant 
extent defined by its ability to stand up to Orbán and to engage 
him effectively. This ability is what opposition voters reward 
primarily, and in this league DK and Momentum stand out at this 
time. Moreover, even when they occupy centrist positions, all of the 
parties in the Hungarian opposition – Jobbik included – evince a 
significant sensitivity to socio-economic issues, which may satisfy 
voters even if the underlying policy responses are not explicitly 
labelled as leftwing. 
For the time being, the opposition parties find themselves in a 
brittle equilibrium based on the individual benefits they have derived 
from the successful electoral cooperation and the hope of future 
successes. But multiple challenges lie ahead. First, the cooperation at 
the municipal level will be fraught with conflict, and some fault lines 
have emerged already within a few weeks of the election. Moreover, 
the opposition parties will have to balance their competitive streak 
and the democratic desire for a greater slice of the electorate with 
the other democratic desire of not undermining the opposition’s unity 
to an extent that makes electoral coordination impossible, which 
would make an opposition victory extremely unlikely. 
The new Budapest leadership under 
government pressure 
No doubt, Budapest was the big prize at the local elections for 
the opposition. The developments concerning the budget, the 
competences and the infrastructural investment plans in late 2019 
already indicate that the new leadership of Budapest will not be short 
of challenges. 
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Four weeks after losing Budapest and 10 of the 23 biggest cities to 
the opposition, the Orbán government submitted a proposal related 
to the use of local business tax revenues, which would considerably 
reduce the new Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony’s powers over 
the	capitalʼs	budget.	The	legislation	–	which	was	approved	by	the	
National Assembly in December - will force local councils to redirect 
the business taxes to finance public transport before any other 
items. Given that the public transport system of Budapest has 
been seriously underfunded since decades, and has relied on cash 
infusions from the central government even under the previous, 
pro-government mayor István Tarlós, the restrictive measure 
threatens to cut other spending including on social services. The City 
of Budapest is already spending half of its business tax revenues 
(roughly €500 million a year) on buses, trams and subways.
Reacting to the bill, Gergely Karácsony called on the government to 
withdraw it. He also urged PM Viktor Orbán not to backtrack on his 
promise to work with local authorities even where his party, Fidesz 
had lost. Orbán said it several times publicly that he was ready to 
cooperate with the responsible leaders of the Hungarian capital. 
The prime minister even invited Karácsony to one of the cabinet 
meetings, and also promised that the government would comply 
with all agreements it struck with Budapest during the previous 
term. A key element of those agreements was that the government 
would not make any decisions concerning Budapest without 
consulting the city’s leadership. The bill about the local business tax 
revenues goes clearly against this promise.
There is another sign that the government changes laws in such a 
way that they will further tie the hands of all municipalities. Until 
now, it was the municipalities that handed out building permits. 
According to an amendment voted in the Hungarian Parliament 
in December 2019, building and construction affairs will be taken 
away from them. This will give the government a free hand to build 
anything anywhere without any consultation with the city leaders. 
The amendment fits into a wider trend regarding the Orbán 
government’s approach towards local governments. Since 2010, 
Orbán has centralized power in Hungary to an unprecedented 
degree, taking away some of the responsibilities and budgets 
of municipalities, including the management of schools and 
hospitals.
Besides turning Budapest into a „green and free” city, Gergely 
Karácsony’s key electoral promise was to stop building stadiums 
and rather focus the resources on improving the state of 
healthcare in the capital city. The first big test of the new mayor’s 
„stop stadiums” pledge is the potential construction of a new 
athletics stadium for the 2023 Athletics World Championships. 
Budapest won the right to host the event last year, and 
constructions should begin soon if the city wishes to go ahead 
with the organisation. Since the local elections, the new Budapest 
leadership has decided to modify somewhat its electoral promise. 
Instead of saying a clear no to the government, the Budapest City 
Council voted unanimously to back hosting the 2023 IAAF World 
Championships in the capital, if certain conditions proposed by the 
opposition are met. 
Support for hosting the world championships has been tied by 
Karácsony to at least 50 billion HUF (€150 million) in additional 
central budget funding for healthcare investments in the capital, 
expanding green spaces around the planned venue of the event, 
the construction of student dormitories and a government promise 
to stand by its earlier commitments regarding the financing of 
public transport in the capital. The Budapest City Council also 
demands full transparency regarding the contracts related to the 
event, including the construction of the new stadium. Karácsony 
demands an official government decision in order to guarantee 
the fulfilment of these conditions. As the event is widely 
considered of personal importance to PM Viktor Orbán, most 
Hungarian opposition politicians believe that setting conditions is 
a good way to force major concessions from the government. The 
government has promised to meet these conditions, and all eyes 
will be on the Orbán cabinet whether they keep their word or not 
in the next years. 
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It is clear that Jobbik has been one of the opposition parties that have 
suffered the most from last year’s massive parliamentary election 
defeat. In a sense, Jobbik’s fall has been the worst since until last 
year it was the top opposition party by a significant margin. It was 
well positioned to play a leading role in challenging the government. 
Instead, it has lost over half of its supporters since 2018, and it 
obviously struggles to connect with voters. 
The causes of Jobbik’s crisis are manifold, and it is difficult to rank 
them by importance. Nevertheless, the most conspicuous is clearly 
the lack of a convincing leader in the vein of the party’s previous chair, 
Gábor Vona. By traditional standards, Gábor Vona may not have been 
charismatic in the sense that Viktor Orbán or Ferenc Gyurcsány seem 
to their respective followers. But Vona did improve over time as an 
orator and despite the shifting ideology of his rhetoric, he exuded a 
credibility that connected with many voters. It was also clear that 
once he left unexpectedly, Jobbik did not have anyone in reserve who 
could match Vona’s popularity with the base or his ability to appeal 
to rural Hungary. The party’s most talented political figure right now, 
Péter Jakab MP, is quickly rising in stature but he has to wait at least 
until the next party congress in 2020 to try to take over the party. 
Seamless integration?
There is some irony in the fact that one of the chief criticisms 
concerning the ascent of the duo of Tamás Sneider and Márton 
Gyöngyösi to the Jobbik leadership in 2018 was that the party 
seemed to be turning its back on Vona’s steadfast pivot towards the 
ideological centre by selecting as its leaders a former skinhead and 
a politician who became notorious for a comment that was widely 
understood to be thinly veiled antisemitism. Nevertheless, despite 
the worries or critical expectations of some, Jobbik has not only 
continued to position itself clearly to the left of Fidesz under Sneider 
and Gyöngyösi, but from the party’s own perspective it has done 
so in a way that risks completely subsuming Jobbik in the general 
opposition without any distinguishing features. 
On issue after issue, from the MTA (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 
scandal over the EU all the way to the passing of the famed left-liberal 
intellectual Ágnes Heller – as a Jew and a former communist, Heller 
was considered one of the archenemies of nationalist Hungarians – 
Jobbik politicians have staked out positions that align increasingly 
closely with the other opposition parties. If you combine that with 
the fact that on many social justice and economic questions Jobbik 
had been fairly leftwing to begin with, then the number of positions 
that make its ideological outlook distinct keep shrinking. Moreover, 
for a variety of reasons, including smoother electoral cooperation 
with the other opposition parties, Jobbik currently finds it advisable 
to downplay the issues where it remains – one must presume – most 
distinctly rightwing, such as for example crime and the integration of 
the Roma minority. 
No familiar faces
Initially, when the rapprochement between Jobbik and the rest of 
the opposition began, the unusual sight was that at the increasingly 
frequent joint opposition press conferences Jobbik politicians stood 
side-by-side with the once reviled representatives of leftwing and 
liberal parties. Now that the novelty has worn off, the surprise is 
usually that although one assumes that a Jobbik politician is present 




at such events, for the most part it is not clear who it is – partly 
because the largest opposition group in parliament has very few 
nationally known faces. The lack of distinct politicians who give the 
party a national voice is one of the most obvious causes behind 
Jobbik’s crisis. 
To some extent, it is also an outgrowth of the peculiar Hungarian 
media environment: while all opposition politicians – Jobbik definitely 
included – are excluded from the Fidesz media that dominates most 
of the Hungarian media system, Jobbik is not widely reported about 
in most of the remaining opposition media, either, because the latter 
tends left on the one hand, and is very Budapest-centred on the other, 
while Jobbik draws much of its remaining strength from rural areas. 
Losing the fringe
The party’s ideological shift under Vona and his successors has 
clearly cost Jobbik a significant chunk of its support (it also won 
many new voters with its mainstreaming strategy, especially among 
youngsters, higher educated voting groups and in Western Hungary). 
But some of this loss arguably occurred already before 2018, when 
there was likely an exchange of voters between Fidesz and Jobbik, 
with immigration obsessives moving towards the governing party 
and disenchanted centrists moving towards Jobbik. At the same time, 
as the evenly split party congress after Vona’s departure in 2018 
revealed, there was a substantial minority in the base that wanted 
the party to draw a clearer line in the sand when it came to centrist 
positions and especially to cooperation with leftwing opposition 
parties. After barely losing the internal vote for the party leadership, 
the losers formed their own party, Our Homeland, whose support 
at roughly 3-4% nationally is significant enough to hurt Jobbik but 
still far too small to be relevant in national politics. This clearly does 
not stop the government media from reporting extensively about 
Our Homeland and its leader László Toroczkai, in the hope that the 
extremists will continue to successfully siphon off support from 
Jobbik towards a non-Fidesz party that is nevertheless harmless 
from the government’s perspective. 
For the time being, Our Homeland occupies the perennial spot of 
radical parties at the margin of politics, and its electoral prospects are 
not particularly rosy, either. Even though its potential pool of voters 
is fairly large with the spread of far-right ideas in Hungarian society, 
most of those who would opt for Our Homeland unhesitatingly as 
their secondary preference have absolutely no reason to abandon 
their primary choice, Fidesz. Our Homeland is trying to compete 
for ideological terrain that is held by a more powerful, popular and 
resourceful occupant. 
Our Homeland’s 3-4% in the polls is of course a substantial chunk 
of potential voters whom Jobbik might be able to reclaim if it were 
credibly to the right. But at the same time it is also clear that this 
reserve is not substantial enough to make the party relevant again: 
assuming that Jobbik would not lose any voters in the centre of the 
political spectrum by moving rightward (an unrealistic assumption), 
currently an additional 3-4 points in the polls would not be enough 
for any more than an unsteady second place in the opposition, far 
removed from the top opposition party status that Jobbik enjoyed 
in 2018. Gábor Vona and those who followed ideologically in his 
footsteps were strategically right: given the Hungarian electoral 
system, there is simply no place for Jobbik to grow on the rightwing 
fringe; like Our Homeland, the party would be doomed to a permanent 
minority status there. 
At this point, it is worth to be mentioned that Jobbik’s mainstreaming 
strategy started in 2013, two years before Fidesz started to move 
forcefully into radical right territory. The radicalisation of Fidesz just 
made it practically impossible for Jobbik to return to their original 
position. Within the framework of the mainstreaming strategy, 
Jobbik has been pretty consistent in leaving racist messages behind 
for six years now. The major change in Jobbik’s politics has been 
that anti-Semitic and anti-Roma messages have disappeared from 
the party’s official statements. Jobbik has also set a softer tone on 
European integration: it no longer wants to leave the EU, and in some 
aspects (wage union, for example) it even urges further integration. 
As long as these positions remain unchanged, it can be argued that 
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we continue to see the more moderate Jobbik, which has apparently 
no plans to return to its far-right roots.  
The dilemma
However, the current dilemma for Jobbik is that there is no room for it 
to grow elsewhere, either. The party has not found a way to position 
itself strategically in the centre in a way that could really meaningfully 
distinguish it from the other opposition parties. A crucial strategic 
challenge for Jobbik is the rise of Momentum. For a time, Jobbik could 
hope that the parties of the old left, MSZP and DK, would further 
weaken by the years, leaving a more centrist Jobbik that was popular 
among youth as the sole relevant opposition option for voters who 
transitioned from youth to middle-age after a socialisation as Jobbik 
supporters. If Fidesz were to become unpopular, that would be the 
opening for Jobbik to claim the mantle of a genuine challenger, a 
centrist but moderately nationalist force that holds out the unfulfilled 
promise that Fidesz stood for in 2010, to paraphrase Gábor Vona. 
But that approach was predicated on the absence of a party that is 
successful at challenging Jobbik for the support of young voters, and 
with the rise of Momentum that is no longer given. 
Jobbik is facing at least four fundamental challenges. First, it needs 
to resolve its leadership crisis and find someone who has a popular 
appeal that matches or outshines Gábor Vona’s charisma. Second, it 
needs to find a way to make itself ideologically distinct and relevant 
in a way that does not openly hark back to the racism that previously 
defined its ideological character in the Hungarian political landscape. 
Arguably, the latter is even more difficult, which is why Jobbik 
has struggled for a long time now to say anything original about 
Hungary’s situation. Third, the party seems to have clear problems 
with funding its operations, and this problem is exacerbated by the 
very transparent hostility of the Fidesz-directed public authorities 
that oversee campaign funding and will obviously penalise Jobbik 
for even the minor infractions of the unrealistic campaign and party 
finance regulations. Finally, Jobbik needs media. The lack of media 
access is true for the entire opposition, but maybe more so for Jobbik, 
which is comprehensively shunned by the vast Fidesz media empire 
and for the reasons mentioned above is mostly still a stranger in the 
remaining independent and opposition media. 
What remains 
Jobbik still has one major asset up its sleeve. Despite its battered 
popularity, it remains the only opposition party with a relevant rural 
base. If the opposition wants any connection to the public outside 
urban Hungary, it needs Jobbik’s voters, and for the time being that 
means Jobbik and its activists. If Jobbik is to survive as an integral 
part of the changing opposition landscape, then it must make the 
most of this asset. 
And there are indications that this is happening in fact. In the 
local electoral coordination agreements, Jobbik was barely even 
contesting many urban areas. The largest opposition party in 
parliament accepted what are effectively morsels of representation 
on city councils. In return, the opposition parties lined up behind 
several hopeful Jobbik candidates in rural towns (Jobbik even won in 
two important cities: Dunaújváros and Eger). Given the importance 
of municipal governments in directly connecting with the electorate 
and proving that changing the “governing” party can make a genuine 
difference in people’s lives, this may prove to be an important chance 
for Jobbik. 
If Jobbik’s mayors prove their mettle over the next years, then Jobbik 
will be able to claim that it is indispensable for the opposition in terms 
of rallying rural support. That does not imply that it will necessarily (or 
even likely) retain its position as the leading party of the opposition. 
But even without a position as the leading party, Jobbik might well 
remain the political force that can potentially tip the balance towards 
the opposition in an otherwise close election outcome. This means 
that the rest of the opposition cannot for now afford to alienate Jobbik. 
Their mutual willingness to cooperate quietly shows that both 
sides see the benefit. Clearly, one of the reasons of the smooth 
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cooperation has been that for the most part Jobbik is not competing 
for the same urban seats that are highly coveted by the rest of the 
predominantly urban-based opposition. Ironically enough, it seems 
that this makes Jobbik one of the easiest partners in the immensely 
complex puzzle that is the electoral coordination on the opposition 
side. When problems do arise, these stem mostly from Jobbik’s 
legacy as a racist party and the question of how much the relevant 
sentiments continue to prevail within the party. However, what is 
striking in light of the history of many Jobbik figures is that there have 
been relatively few problems of this kind. This also owes to Jobbik’s 
discipline in deciding not to compete with Our Homeland for the 
fringe vote. Rationally, the party seems to have accepted the loss of 
the furthest right as an irretrievable sunk cost. Both strategically and 
morally that was a wise choice, but it will only pay off if Jobbik can 
address the other major problems inhibiting its rise in the polls.
The local elections held on 13 October 2019 opened a new phase 
and changed the mood of Hungarian politics. PM Viktor Orbán has 
suffered his first electoral blow since coming to power in 2010, with 
an opposition candidate scoring a shock win in the Budapest mayoral 
race and the opposition performing above expectations in other 
cities. The vote was seen as a litmus test for the opposition parties’ 
new strategy of cooperation, which could offer a route to mount a 
serious challenge to Orbán at the next general election in 2022. 
Following an initial, relatively friendly approach from both sides 
after the local elections, in the last few weeks of 2019 the muscle 
flexing before the 2022 parliamentary elections has started. To run 
Budapest, the new mayor Gergely Karácsony has to collaborate 
with the Orbán government, while simultaneously demonstrating 
his power to challenge it. He has to maintain cooperation with the 
government, while the government is not interested in his success. 
This strategic insight is driving the negotiation strategy of the new 
Budapest mayor. 
At the same time, while the government’s political interest is to make 
sure that the new mayors supported by the opposition parties do not 
become successful politicians, it is also true that the government is 
not interested in turning the whole population of these cities against 
itself. The need for such a delicate balancing act explains why the 
prime minister makes relatively cooperative comments in public, and 
then opens the door to financially squeeze Budapest, for example. 





It seems that the Hungarian government aims to create a situation 
in which the cities that are run by opposition politicians can still 
function, but the hands of the new mayors are so tied that they are 
unable to fulfil their electoral promises. Forcing local governments 
to finance public transport completely from their local business tax 
revenues could potentially reach exactly this goal. 
Fidesz has also learnt the lesson that the cooperation of opposition 
parties is the single biggest threat to its power. As a result, the 
National Assembly passed an amendment to the Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure that will make it significantly more difficult to 
the opposition to cooperate at the next parliamentary elections. 
According to the new rules, independent MPs can no longer join 
parliamentary groups. What Fidesz basically wants to prevent with 
this amendment is opposition candidates running independently en 
masse only to form their parliamentary groups once elected, since 
during the local elections campaign many opposition politicians 
ran as independent candidates with informal party support. The 
new rules will not allow parliamentary groups to split either. So for 
instance, if at the next elections, parties of a fragmented opposition 
decided to run on a joint list, they would be forced to stay within the 
same parliamentary group for the entire term. It is worth to stress 
that the campaign finance rules also provide more funding to the 
opposition parties if they run separately in Hungary’s 106 electoral 
districts. 
Although the governing party apparently puts extra obstacles in the 
way of cooperation, there is clearly no alternative to the opposition 
parties. The local elections proved that the strategy to create face-
to-face situations between the government and opposition works, 
and despite all the potential difficulties, it seems guaranteed that 
the strategy will continue for 2022. Local election results have 
given hope to opposition voters, and the major challenge of the new 
mayors supported by the coalition of opposition parties in 2020 
and beyond is to maintain their support by proving that politics and 
policies can be different from how Fidesz has governed Hungary 
since 2010. 
The campaign promises and the first few months in office of 
successful opposition candidates throughout the country – who also 
formed the “Alliance of Free Cities” at the end of 2019 – suggest that 
the overall goal may be to create a more social and green alternative 
to Fidesz’s governance with a series of local policies that can prove the 
competence of the opposition to govern. Based on their first moves, 
the priorities of the new mayors also include a strong commitment to 
transparency, participation and inclusion. 
Besides setting up laboratories of good governance, for the 
opposition one of the main challenges in the coming years will be 
to find ways to reach the rural public while making sure that the 
urban electorate continues to support it. The positive results at 
the local elections can only be interpreted as a good first step. In 
order to be competitive at the national level, the opposition parties 
need to gain more support in rural Hungary, which starts with 
strengthening their local infrastructure and increase their presence 
in villages. Looking back at the dynamics of the last decade, that is 
not going to be easy.








Although Fidesz’s nine-year long Eurosceptic campaign has not 
reversed the general positive domestic assessment of the EU, 
its effect can be detected, without doubt. As a Policy Solutions 
research published in 2019 (“15 years on – The European Union 
and the Hungarian society”) showed, the Hungarian society 
evaluates the country’s first 15 years as a member state of the EU 
favourably, and still associates the community with positive values. 
However, the EU’s favourable assessment is based mainly on 
material reasons (contribution to Hungary’s prosperity and wealth). 
Currently, the highest proportion of Eurosceptic citizens is among 
Fidesz voters, and almost the same amount of people think that the 
EU is heading in the wrong direction as those who think otherwise. 
The government’s messages about defending national sovereignty 
have a wide audience as limitations on sovereignty is a decisive 
detriment for many voters and support for making decisions in 
national competence has a majority in most policy fields. Orbán’s 
fight for “national sovereignty” must be seen in this context: he has 
the support of his followers. 
The narrative propagated by the Orbán government and its media 
empire has been for years that the European conservatives were 
abandoning the ideal of Christian Europe to serve some liberal 
agenda, especially in terms of allowing in “hordes of Muslim 
invaders” who are planning to move here by the millions, driven 
by a desire to conquer the continent in the name of their religion. 
In Orbán’s interpretation of events, the European People’s Party 
had two options to choose from. First, it could come around 
ideologically, recognise Orbán’s position on immigration and allow 
him to build a bridge towards parts of the far-right. This would 
make Orbán the linchpin of the new broad alliance and allow 
the EPP to reassert its position as the largest EP group by far, 
while also claiming the Orbánian mantle of being the staunchest 
defender of Europe and Christianity. Second, in the first half of 
2019, Fidesz and the pro-government media suggested that the 
alternative was that EPP would be buried by the voters, which 
would turn towards the far-right in droves, while Fidesz would 
become a leading force in a newly ascendant populist faction in 
the EP. 
The European People’s Party — less afraid 
and more tired of Orbán
As we showed in Chapter 1, in this respect, things did not go 
as Orbán planned. A stronger electoral performance of the 
European far-right (and the continuation of the most severly 
felt uncertainties of many EPP-members regarding the future 
of moderate conservative parties) would have been essential 
for this strategy to succeed. In the showdown with the EPP, the 
latter did not blink, it unequivocally rejected following Orbán down 
what it perceived as a far-right and authoritarian course, and it 
also roundly dismissed the Hungarian prime minister’s proposal 
to ally with Salvini and other far-right populists. Vitally for Orbán, 
his key allies within the EPP (such as the German and the Austrian 
centre-right parties), who had held the line for years despite his 
increasingly flagrant abuses of democratic ground rules and the 
erosion of the rule of law under Fidesz, also moved away from him 
and aired their disappointment with the Hungarian leader publicly. 
Although Orbán has avoided publicly cutting the ties to the European 
People’s Party, until the EP election in May all the indications were 
3.1  Fidesz’s place in Europe after the European 
elections
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that Fidesz would quit the EPP and join forces with Salvini. The 
pro-government media, which generally follows Orbán’s lead and 
would never dare take a position on such an issue for fear of running 
afoul of the prime minister, shot ahead on this particular issue, no 
doubt primed by the government to demand most energetically 
that Fidesz quit the softened EPP “liberals” and join up with the real 
men on the right. 
Backing down from the European far-right 
alliance
Given Orbán’s general pragmatism and preference for interests 
over principles, it should not have been surprising, but it was still 
stunning to behold how quickly the Hungarian prime minister 
disavowed the idea of the far-right alliance led by Salvini. Although 
lauding the Italian far-right leader personally, Fidesz made clear 
that it wishes to remain a part of the EPP. Orbán in the meanwhile 
knows that his position in the EPP is weakened because of his 
previous actions (as a consequence, Fidesz could not attend the 
EPP party congress in Zagreb in November 2019), so the challenge 
is for him to regain the favours of the EPP elite that he has alienated 
without appearing obsequious, which would undermine him in 
the eyes of his followers. This does not mean that the numerous 
Fidesz-sceptics in the EPP ranks will be easy to appease. The 
scandals surrounding the Hungarian governing party have caused a 
rift within the EPP, and several member parties would prefer to see 
Fidesz on the outside even at the risk of Orbán boosting the ranks 
of the far-right. 
Finding a place for Fidesz in Europe
The European People’s Party will decide whether to expel Viktor 
Orbán’s Fidesz party from its ranks in early 2020. In a speech at 
the EPP party congress, Donald Tusk, the new EPP President – and 
arch-rival	of	Orbán’s	closest	ally	in	the	region,	Jarosław	Kaczyński	-	
vowed to fight “populists, manipulators, and autocrats”. According 
to him, these politicians „lead people to believe that freedom 
cannot be reconciled with security, that protecting our borders and 
territory cannot be reconciled with liberal democracy, and effective 
governance with the rule of law”. Tusk called this conflict „the essence 
of the internal debate” within the EPP.
The decision about the future of the Hungarian governing party will 
be based on a report prepared by a three-person panel of „wise 
men”, led by former Belgian Prime Minister and Ex-President of the 
European Council Herman Van Rompuy. The „three wise men” are 
asked to investigate the state of democracy and the rule of law in 
Hungary and issue recommendations on whether the EPP should 
expel Fidesz. This report is due in January 2020. To be realistic, 
regardless of the outcome of this process, Orbán’s influence in the 
EPP is much diminished anyway. Even if Fidesz could somehow retain 
its membership, that would be a formal arrangement without much 
room for substantive input in the policy/decision-making process. 
At the end of 2019, it is clear that Fidesz is in a weaker bargaining 
position, which is distinctly manifest in its unusually gentle tone 
towards the EPP.
In any case, it must be also mentioned that Fidesz does wield some 
influence at the European level, except it does not do so through 
the 13 MEPs that are often mentioned as its chief source of power. 
Fidesz’s influence stems from its behaviour in the Council, where it 
could potentially drift in a direction of undermining any joint work. 
Currently, despite its intensely anti-EU rhetoric, the government 
has not embraced a systematically obstructionist role in the Council. 
Generally, most of the conflicts with the European Commission – 
and also within the EPP – stem from things Fidesz does at home 
rather than in Brussels. But recently, news about obstruction – with 
Hungary alone impeding joint communiqués, for instance – have 
begun to proliferate, and they offer a glimpse into a future that the 
EU can ill afford. There is risk that kicking Fidesz out of the EPP could 
result in Fidesz going berserk in the Council. For the European centre-
right, Fidesz is thus trying to create a major dilemma that will likely 
have an impact beyond the next few months when the basic decision 
for the immediate future will be taken.  
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Difficulties surrounding the nomination of 
Hungary’s new EU Commissioner
The seriously damaged image of Fidesz among the mainstream 
European political groups has not only been reflected in the debate 
about the party’s fate within the EPP, but also in the difficulties 
surrounding the approval of Hungary’s new EU Commissioner. László 
Trócsányi, a former justice minister, and Orbán’s first candidate for the 
post, was rejected by the European Parliament. Trócsányi’s nomination 
was widely considered as a risky move from the start, given that 
the Orbán government came under scrutiny precisely because of 
accusations that it breached the rule of law. The EP did not even hold 
a hearing for the Commissioner-designate of Hungary, after the Legal 
Affairs committee concluded that he was not fit for the job due to a 
conflict of interest (the hearing of Romania’s original candidate, Rovana 
Plumb, was cancelled because of the same reasons).
Following the rejection of László Trócsányi by the European 
Parliament, Viktor Orbán nominated a diplomat, the Permanent 
Representative of Hungary to the European Union Olivér Várhelyi 
as the replacement. There were no changes to the portfolios within 
the European Commission, Várhelyi received the enlargement and 
neighbourhood portfolio in the von der Leyen Commission. Várhelyi 
has been known as highly loyal to Orbán and as an assertive 
advocate for the Hungarian government’s political priorities in 
ambassadors’ meetings. Várhelyi also faced some difficulties, as he 
failed to convince the EP’s committee during his hearing, but he got a 
second chance to prove that he would be independent, that he would 
not be in thrall to the Hungarian government as a Commissioner. 
In an additional round of questions and answers, the EP gave him 
the green light. Várhelyi needed to confirm in writing that he will 
“neither be bound nor influenced by any statement or position of 
any Prime Minister of any country or any other representatives of 
any government.” Pro-government media was enthusiastic after 
the approval of Várhelyi, Viktor Orbán even said that gaining the 
European Commission’s enlargement and neighbourhood portfolio is 
Hungary’s greatest diplomatic success of the last ten years.
Demanding a ‘fair’ EU budget
The developments of 2019 have also indicated that the next EU 
budget is likely to become the next hot issue in the relationship of 
the Hungarian government and the European Union. In November, 
Viktor Orbán made some remarks about the currently circulating 
proposal for the next European Union budget, and he called it unfair 
and stressed that „we want justice”. 
According to the Hungarian prime minister, it must be taken into 
account that what Central European countries receive in funding 
is largely going back to the Western member states as the newer 
member states open their markets, and that must be reflected in the 
proposal. Orbán also said that it is unfair to reduce cohesion funds 
because the result is “the poorer someone is, the more money taken 
from him”. The same applies to climate neutrality. Orbán emphasized 
that the general level of economic development remains a decisive 
factor in the cost of achieving a carbon-free economy. Hungary 
is ready to achieve a carbon-neutral economy by 2050, said the 
Hungarian PM, but “we want to see the source of its funding in the 
budget on a fair basis”. 
Besides the amount available to Hungary in the 2021-2027 EU budget, 
the other key issue is the potential link between rule of law and the 
use of EU funds. Representatives of the Hungarian government have 
made it clear several times that Budapest will resist any European 
Commission effort to condition EU development funding to rule-
of-law standards, which Brussels sees as being undermined by the 
Hungarian authorities. When Commission President Ursula von der 
Leyen presented her programme for the next five years, she has 
stressed that respecting fundamental EU values would be at the 
heart of her policies. While the European Commission is working on 
making EU funds conditional on respecting democratic rules – and 
most Member States agree with this proposal – Gergely Gulyás, the 
minister in charge of the Prime Minister’s office has said Hungary 
will veto the EU budget in its current form. According to Gulyás, 
Hungary’s main objection is that the EU would make payments to 
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members conditional on rule of law criteria, instead of each country’s 
performance and fiscal discipline. 
The debates that have started already in 2019 around the next EU 
budget suggest that Hungary as a country might pay a substantial 
price for the poor image of the Hungarian government in mainstream 
European political circles. This is the time when Hungary would need 
more allies to improve its financial position in the next EU budget. 
However, following the numerous conflicts of the last few years, it 
seems that the good will that the Orbán government can count on 
in this vital process is rather limited. This also explains why Orbán 
is now trying to find strategic alternatives to secure more funding 
in the next budgetary term (such as vetos in the Council, or placing 
himself as an intermediary between the EU and the illiberal regimes 
of the East).  
For years now, Viktor Orbán has tried to balance his political and 
personal sympathies for certain eastern authoritarian leaders and 
their regimes with Hungary’s formal commitment to European 
integration in the form of the European Union and to the western 
defence system in the form of NATO. From the very start, this put 
Orbán – and by extension Hungary – in an awkward position. For 
example, when Vladimir Putin invaded Crimea and split it off Ukraine, 
Viktor Orbán found himself in the uneasy position of being alone 
in an outraged European Union to publicly stand by his friendship 
and political alliance with the Russian President. Clearly, Orbán did 
not go as far as to condone Putin’s actions in Ukraine, but he was 
continuously evasive when it came to condemning it. 
Solidly anchored in the illiberal East 
The political stars aligned in Orbán’s favour in the last few years, 
as despite Putin’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy the unity 
in the West was undermined by the surge of European actors who 
are broadly sympathetic to what one might legitimately call the 
“Orbán way” in the broadest sense of the word. With the ascendance 
of Putin-friendliness in a variety of EU governments, such as for 
example Greece, Italy, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Orbán was 
no longer isolated in this matter. And when Donald Trump won the 
US election in 2016, that proved to be the completely unexpected 
ace up Orbán’s sleeves. Now his policy moved from high-risk to low-
risk to downright prescient. Viktor Orbán found himself in a leading 
role of a resurgent international movement of pro-Putin and anti-
immigration rightwing populists. 
3.2  Hungary’s foreign 
policy in global 
context
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Ever since, Orbán has been pushing his anti-western, pro-
authoritarian rhetorics more, which continues to be reflected in 
both his domestic and international policies. While this consistent 
policy cannot be reduced to any singular datapoint, the twin visits of 
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkey’s leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan in late October and early November 2019, respectively, was 
nevertheless another symbolic high point showing how Orbán has 
realigned himself internationally. 
Traces of Viktor Orbán’s balancing act remain, but it is increasingly 
seen as a sham. The Hungarian prime minister has now solidly 
anchored himself and Hungary in the “illiberal East” (or what he 
perceives as such).  
More steadfastly forward on a well-trodden 
path 
This is not at all entirely new, of course, but 2019 has been 
nevertheless a year when what previously might have seemed 
like haphazard and inconsistent manoeuvring, a back and forth 
between conflicting loyalties, has more clearly than ever revealed 
itself as a deliberate approach that firmly entrenches Hungary 
in a strategic alignment with global authoritarianism. What has 
brought this to the fore in autumn 2019 was not the umpteenth 
visit of Vladimir Putin in Budapest. The regularity of these ties 
has led to a habituation, and at this point many of the relevant 
questions about these visits – such as their purpose – are no longer 
asked as pointedly as they were before. The lack of transparency 
in the government’s communication about the substance of the 
cooperation between the two leaders is now part of the accepted 
political practice in Hungary.
What struck a chord in the fall of 2019 was Hungary’s veto of a joint 
EU resolution against the Turkish invasion into Kurdish-controlled 
territory in Syria. The government did not leave it at that, however, 
but even as news about atrocities in the wake of the Turkish invasion 
spread, the Fidesz government expressed its support for the Turkish 
actions in advance of Erdogan’s visit to Budapest, which turned into 
one of the most elaborate state visits in modern memory. Large 
sections of the Hungarian capital were shut down, with no public 
or private vehicular transportation, and in large areas also without 
pedestrian traffic. 
What about minorities then? 
The ceremonial welcome seemed problematic not only because of 
the traditional liberal concerns that Orbán scoffs at – i.e. the cynicism 
which is manifested in celebrating a politician who had just given 
orders which resulted in massive human rights violations – but also 
because Erdogan’s policies in Kurdistan run so obviously afoul of one 
of Hungary’s most important foreign policy objectives, namely the 
protection of national and ethnic minorities. 
Because of the large Hungarian diasporas living in the regions of the 
neighbouring countries which Hungary lost after World War I, the 
Hungarian government – especially under Fidesz – has been highly 
protective of the interests of national minorities. Although Hungary 
has few national minorities, they have extensive formal rights and 
the Hungarian government is pushing hard for international rules 
that protect the cultural and other interests of such communities. 
In fact, Orbán and his government have been harshly critical of 
Ukraine’s treatment of their Hungarian minority and use this as a 
justification for blocking a common EU policy towards Ukraine and 
for arguing that Putin has a point in his anti-Ukraine campaign. 
Needless to say, what Erdogan’s army and their allied militia have 
been doing to the Kurds is completely antithetical to how the 
Hungarian government wants its Romanian, Slovakian, Ukrainian 
and Croatian neighbours, for example, to relate to their respective 
Hungarian minorities. 
It’s the refugees, stupid
The government’s justification was that Erdogan is ultimately the key 
to the European refugee crisis, and that if he were to decide to pull 
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the plug that has kept millions of Syrian civil war refugees in Turkey, 
then that would plunge Europe into another crisis as seen in 2015. 
Even if we acknowledge that Turkey’s control over the volume of 
European refugee flows is indeed massive, the implications of Orbán’s 
comments on the subject are stunning in how they cast his previous 
communication on the migrant issue in a completely different light. It is 
a tacit acknowledgment first of all that Erdogan is a crucial lever when 
it comes to European refugee flows. If one extends this logic back to 
2015, then it raises the question of the role that the now celebrated 
Erdogan played in the massively increased refugee flows that year, 
which Orbán portrayed as the gravest threat to Hungary and Europe. 
This was the crisis that Orbán has used – or rather exploited – to 
dominate Hungarian political discourse for several years now. He has 
also used that opportunity to emerge as a key European player and 
a widely recognised standard bearer of anti-migration sentiments 
on the continent. At the same time, it also raises questions about the 
role of Vladimir Putin in the refugee crisis because Russia’s military 
engagement in Syria, its assistance to the Assad regime, have played 
a major role in the mass of refugees who are stuck in Turkey and are 
potentially threatening to spill over into Europe. 
A fusion of domestic and foreign policies 
The Erdogan issue and its connection to the refugee question and 
the Russian angle highlight a key feature of Orbán’s foreign policy. 
They are completely inseparable from domestic considerations, 
that is Orbán’s foreign policy agenda is seamlessly integrated into 
his domestic communication. Most facets of foreign policy are 
subordinated not to Hungary’s long-term strategic interests – which 
would clearly position the country in a deeper European integration 
and in the western alliance – but to Fidesz’s power interests. 
But the intertwinement between his foreign and domestic policies 
is not limited to issues that one might broadly call material or 
tactical interests, the relationship also extends to the ideological 
level. In understanding this, it is vital to consider how Orbán’s praise 
of authoritarian leaders – not only Putin and Erdogan, but also for 
example his fawning over assorted dictators at the Turkic Council 
in October 2019 – mesh with his ill-defined vision of an illiberal 
regime. When Orbán rails about vaguely specified concepts, there is a 
tendency not to take his pronouncements seriously because they are 
so vague and because sometimes they turn out to be nothing more 
than rhetorical flourish. 
At the same time, however, Orbán does have a wish to be taken 
seriously and thus it is worth listening to what he says and how his 
words may translate into policy – or regime-building, for that matter. 
Arguably, if some of his earlier pronouncements on politics had been 
taken more seriously, then neither disaffected conservatives in 
Hungary nor international players would be surprised by many of his 
actions today.
And while it is of course always true that foreign policy is intertwined 
with domestic politics, it does not always map this neatly onto the 
domestic ideological preferences as it does with Orbán, who tends 
to have contempt for democratic leaders while he usually harbours 
friendly admiration for authoritarian leaders. 
Birds of a feather 
Orbán’s sympathies for authoritarianism and his physical and 
symbolic embraces of Erdogan and such leaders are not born out of 
strategic necessity. When Orbán speaks of Hungarians as a “semi-
Asian people” who crave a commensurate regime, he is not babbling, 
and he has built his entire foreign policy around demonstrating the 
weight of this statement. If anything, it is his efforts to remain on 
basically friendly terms with democratic leaders which reflect a 
concession to the essential strategic needs (especially in economic 
terms) of a small Central European country whose economic fortunes 
are deeply entangled with European democratic regimes. 
That his commitment to Hungary’s traditional alliances are phony 
is by now abundantly clear, and his repeated willingness to torpedo 
joint European positions on Russia and Turkey – and to do so alone, 
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isolated even from his allies in Central and Eastern Europe – for 
example, should have driven this point home everywhere, from 
Brussels to Washington. 
It is Orbán’s historic luck that with Donald Trump in the White House 
he has found a rare US leader who genuinely empathises with this 
outlook, even if unlike Orbán Trump is bound like Ulysses to the mast 
of the US constitution and cannot yet wriggle free to follow himself the 
alluring siren song of authoritarianism. It is inconceivable that under 
any other US presidential candidate competing in 2016 Orbán would 
have received a hearing in Washington given his open allegiance to 
the United States’ key international rivals (China included, which even 
Trump regards as an enemy). However, as things stand, the invitation 
Orbán received to talk to Trump in the White House in May 2019 – a 
massive success for Hungarian foreign policy – is further evidence 
for Viktor Orbán that his policies are aligned with broader historical 
trends. 
It was only under Trump that Orbán could become so blatantly open 
about his allegiance to Putin without facing a massive blowback from 
the US. Moreover, in an especially fortuitous turn of events for Orbán, 
Trump’s obsession with Ukraine for domestic political reasons has 
also played into Orbán’s hands. It has allowed Orbán to act as an 
intermediary on the subject for Putin, badmouthing the Ukrainians to 
Trump, who could point to the “objective” opinion of an ally to justify 
what he believed anyway, namely that the Ukrainians are the bad 
guys in the regional conflict.
Western in name only 
The implications of Orbán’s massive reorientation of Hungarian 
foreign policy are profound, especially because of what they reveal 
about his understanding of democracy. But they are of course also 
vital in terms of Hungary’s role in the European Union and NATO, 
which have to figure out how they can continue operating with it. 
Thanks especially to Trump, but also because of the rise of his populist 
friends across the EU in recent years, and because of the focus on 
Brexit, Orbán has gotten by amazingly easily with his unorthodox 
foreign policy. Ordinarily, one would have predicted that this course 
would have ruffled a lot more feathers. 
Given the unpredictability of global developments, it is hard to say 
how long his luck will last. At least two major pieces of the puzzle 
must continue to align for him. First, he must hope that Trump 
remains in office, because his ouster could induce a massive 
realignment of US foreign policy, which would have both a direct 
impact on US-Hungarian bilateral relations and an indirect impact 
through potentially reinvigorating NATO. 
Importantly, the Hungarian PM has also staked out a cultural and 
historical position in his speeches and in his foreign policy, and his 
message is both literally and in the form of specific policies that 
Hungary should be what his understanding is of an “Asian” country 
and a “work-based society”, meaning broadly authoritarian, strictly 
hierarchical and mostly inegalitarian. It is doubtful that if they 
understood this in detail, the Hungarian public could muster up as 
much enthusiasm for this ideal as the remaining Fidesz intelligentsia 
and media profess day to day. But as long as the economy works well 
and travel is not restricted, large parts of the public – including some 
Fidesz supporters – seem to put this off as just political babble. 
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In 2020, the poor image of the Hungarian government at the European 
level could prove to be costly during the EU budget negotiations for 
the budget cycle 2021-2027, which are of cardinal importance for 
Hungary. They are a crucial component of the government’s vaunted 
economic success, and as such a key feature of the most important 
pillar of its public support. At the moment, Orbán is not isolated in 
the EU.  On many of the issues where he is most extreme, he can 
count on the support of at least some fellow EU members, especially 
in the region. But as he is increasingly willing to play the loner in 
vetoing otherwise unanimous EU positions, the game could become 
dangerous and set him once again on the path of isolation from which 
he successfully rebounded just a few years ago. At the same time, 
such behaviour in the Council can be also interpreted as raising the 
stakes for EPP to oust Fidesz.  
The EPP membership has provided an increasingly tenuous cover 
against such a development; it is difficult to conceive that the EU 
could take serious actions against the Orbán government if the EPP 
does not break with Fidesz. However, if and when that protective 
umbrella is gone, Hungary might be exposed to a variety of negative 
consequences in response to Orbán’s actions. But in the end, it 
is highly doubtful whether Orbán will make any substantial long-
term concession in exchange for EPP membership. Thus far he has 
not, and nine years into the game, it is late to reinvent himself as a 
compromiser.
3.3  Outlook on 
Hungary’s place 
in the world 
in 2020
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Despite his professed willingness to remain part of the centre-
right European People’s Party, Viktor Orbán has practically aligned 
Hungary with the far-right forces that see Vladimir Putin as one of 
the main bulwarks against European federalism. Orbán’s balancing 
act between the EU and NATO on the one hand, and Putin, Erdogan 
and authoritarians on the other, is no longer an artistic performance 
– it is a stage illusion. Orbán’s most effective magic trick has been 
to make his European and Trans-Atlantic partners believe that he is 
still part of the Western alliance system, all the while he has time 
and again openly shown fealty to Putin and other authoritarians who 
wish to undermine the same alliance system that Orbán claims to be 
a part of. The cosiness of Orbán’s strategic position still hinges on his 
ability to keep the illusion going.
What we have underestimated in recent years is the West’s 
willingness to go along with the illusion of the balancing act and to 
continue hoping despite all signs to the contrary that at the core 
Orbán might be one of their own even as he courts authoritarian 
leaders with visible delight. As long as there is no acceptance of the 
fact that the Orbán train has left the station and is headed towards 
the “Illiberal East”, the EU and NATO are unlikely to come up with 
a strategy for handling Orbán’s strategic shift and considering 
its ramifications for the Central and Eastern European region in 
particular and Europe and the West more generally. 
Whereas others who are at odds with the general European course 
prefer to lay low to avoid unwanted attention (cf. Slovakia’s ruling Smer 
party, which agrees with Orbán on many of his most controversial 
policies) or feel discomfort at the notion of undermining the alliances 
that provide their security umbrella even if they disagree with many 
of the core values of the West (cf. Law and Justice of Poland), Viktor 
Orbán embraces controversy and limelight. It is part of his character 
and it works, electorally, too, in a country that may be small but where 
the public sympathises with Orbán’s ambition for more international 
influence. Although Viktor Orbán is not risk-averse, he is not blind 
to risks. This makes it impossible to predict whether he will ever 
break with the West openly if he is forced to choose. But it is not in 
his interest to decide unless he is compelled to do so. Thus, he will 
court controversy in foreign and domestic policy as long as he can 
get away with it – and then declare his preference based on a cost-
benefit calculus. Once that situation comes, one can only hope that 
the macroeconomic interests that tie Hungary to the West will prove 
stronger than the financial interests and authoritarian values that 
bind Orbán to his fellow authoritarian leaders in Russia and beyond. 
The division between Fidesz and opposition voters over decision-
making competences predicts that the debates about Europe’s 
future which are expected to be more frequent in the following 
years will further polarise Hungarian society. The supporters of 
opposition parties approve of a decision-making coordinated with 
Brussels; however, demanding the “United States of Europe” is not a 
mainstream position. Opposition voters still have a clear confidence 
in the EU, and in the beneficial effect European integration may 
have on the country – and not just in an economic sense. Voters of 
each opposition party explicitly expect the EU to prioritize defending 
democracy and the rule of law, as well as demand tougher actions 
in the fight against corruption and the misuse of EU funds. Living 
up to these expectations may influence a great deal whether the 
EU can remain the same positive point of reference for the majority 
of Hungarians as it has been in the last 15 years. This is why the 
interpretation of events (blame game) between the government and 
the opposition will be so vital if Hungary ends up with significantly 
less EU funds for the 2021-2027 period than during the current term. 







In 2019, the Hungarian government proved wrong all naysayers with 
strong (in some cases even record-braking) macroeconomic figures. 
Real GDP growth was amongst the best in the EU, although Hungary 
slipped back to fourth place in GDP per capita compared to the other 
three Visegrád countries. For the time being, visible cracks in the 
unity in economic policy leadership did not translate into subpar 
economic performance. The government maintained its fiscally 
conservative stance even in the face of ever-frequent signs of crisis 
in many sectors of social policy, including education and healthcare. 
The decline in German manufacturing and the potential drying 
up of EU funds also cast a shadow on the immediate outlook for 
maintaining a healthy macroeconomic balance. The government 
adapted to a possible global recession with a reorientation towards 
the digital economy, a modest economic action plan and a new 
strategy for boosting the competitiveness of small and medium-
sized enterprises. 
A full employment economy with warning 
signs of exhaustion
The Hungarian economy continued on its high-growth path with a 
year-on-year real GDP growth level of 4.6% according to estimates 
by the European Commission (see Table 2). This rate was exceptional 
both in comparison to data from the previous decade and vis-á-vis 
the average of the Visegrád 4 countries over this period. According to 
OECD historical real growth rate data, while each of the four countries 
had its moment in the sun, ever since 2013 Hungary has maintained 
its first or second position in this group (with the exception of 2015-
2016). This trajectory was also synchronized with Poland, to a large 
degree. In line with our estimation in last year’s edition this signals 
a slowdown in the rapid economic expansion of the late 2010s. 
However, the robust growth figure, which put the country in second 
place in the EU28 behind Ireland, surprised most economic analysts. 
4.1  General overview of 
the Hungarian economy
Indicators 2018 2019 2020 2021
GDP growth (%, yoy) 5,1 4,6 2,8 2,8
Inflation (%, yoy) 2,9 3,4 3,1 3,0
Unemployment (%) 3,7 3,4 3,4 3,4
Public budget balance (% of GDP) -2,3 -1,8 -1,0 -0,8
Gross public debt (% of GDP) 70,2 68,2 66,7 64,4
Current account balance (% of GDP) -0,3 -1,2 -0,8 -0,7
Table 2. Key indicators of the Hungarian economy (2018-2021)
Source: European Commission
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According to the last available data of the third quarter of 2019, 
from the production side the composition of growth was balanced 
between industry, construction and market services (most 
importantly: tourism). On the one hand, construction posted a 
18 per cent expansion figure based on a last ditch effort to put 
to use all remaining EU funds from the 2014-2020 cycle. On the 
other hand, agriculture contracted on a yearly basis by 1.6 per cent 
while it is also notable that administrative, education and health 
services lost 1.4 per cent in value added. In terms of expenditure, 
both household consumption and investment reached around 4 
per cent of growth, with government consumption lagging behind. 
Despite expectations for the opposite, the current account 
balance remained in negative territory due to a strong demand for 
imports. 
Inflation remained firmly within the tolerance band of the Hungarian 
National Bank, MNB (3 perc cent +/- 1 percentage point). The 3.3-3.4 
per cent headline rate was expected to stabilize in the near future 
by both EU and domestic estimations. Core inflation surpassed the 
general consumer price inflation figure due to, inter alia, the subdued 
increase in global fuel prices. Unemployment continued its course 
towards historic lows with a 3.4 headline rate coupled with a similarly 
exceptional 63 per cent activity rate in the 15-74 age group. This 
figure stood at 72 per cent in the more restrictive 15-64 group, which 
hovered around the average of Eastern European countries. 
The traditionally conservative fiscal policy of post-2010 Orbán 
governments yielded yet another year of sub-2 per cent public budget 
deficit. Social expenditures – with the usual exception of pensions 
– were firmly under control and the installation of a country-wide 
system of cash-register control brought in the necessary tax 
revenues for government pet projects (such as the renewal of the 
infrastructure of both amateur and professional football). Fiscal 
restraint allowed for the continuation of a long-standing debt 
reduction path – a good investment as interest rate expenditures 
also plummeted from 4.3 per cent of GDP in 2012 to 2.3 per cent in 
2018 (the latest figure available). 
Financial self-reliance was also reinforced by a controversial new 
product of state debt management, the Hungarian Government 
Security Plus. A security with a nominally 5-year maturity, it provided 
household investors with a 1-3% yield premium and duly sucked out 
long-term investments from the banking sector. While the strategic 
importance of relying on domestic savings for government debt 
financing is undeniable, the de facto buy-back guarantee associated 
with the new product may in fact contribute to financial instability in 
a more uncertain environment. 
In the aftermath of the “financial war of independence” of the early 
2010s, the Hungarian government struggled hard to re-establish 
trust with international investors and institutions. It took a concerted 
effort to ameliorate the tarnished country brand by setting up 
strategic partnership agreements, handing out tax breaks and 
other regulatory incentives (such as land grants for a new BMW 
plant in Debrecen) and in general striking a conciliatory tone with 
any foreign party which accepted the government’s premise of 
economic sovereignty in bilateral relations. By the late 2010s this 
push stabilized Hungary’s position as a more or less business friendly 
target for investment. 
All this was reflected on multiple comparative rankings, such as the 
annual list of the Institute for Management Development (IMD). 
On this list, which was based on measures of competitiveness, 
Hungary retained its 47th place out of 63 countries. By contrast, 
Czechia, Poland and Slovenia once again made it into the top 40. 
Hungary came in at exactly the position on a similar list by the 
World Economic Forum (this latter contains 141 countries). As 
in previous years, the country lagged behind all other Visegrád 
4 countries despite gaining one place on the list and a small 
improvement in the overall score. These scores provide some 
food for thought when it comes to the ongoing debate on how to 
properly assess the performance of the Hungarian economy and 
that of economic policy.
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Good macroeconomic results 
in an illiberal political regime
The strong macroeconomic performance of the Hungarian economy 
made many commentators scratch their head. After all, these data 
suggest that an illiberal political regime may allow for superior 
macroeconomic performance vis-á-vis liberal democracies even in 
Central and Eastern Europe, inside the European Union. Many of the 
aforementioned indicators were either better than average in historical 
comparison (such as growth or the budget deficit) or even record-
breaking as was in the case of unemployment, even though the social 
reality in Hungary did not improve as nicely as the macroeconomic 
performance. This left Fidesz in a strong rhetorical position: they 
seemingly outplayed liberal economists on their own turf.
Four lines of criticism were levelled against the government’s narrative 
of success. These were associated with different degrees of skepticism 
with regards to official numbers. All four have some merit, yet applying 
all four at once would render any debate of macroeconomic trends 
pointless. The first critique claims that government statistics is 
doctored. Especially in the case of inflation, this position was widely 
adopted in social media. There was in fact a debate in expert circles 
on the usefulness of extant inflation measurement and the Hungarian 
National Bank, for its part, was in the reform camp. Also, in the past, 
Eurostat did, in fact, nullified creative accounting with regards to 
quasi-governmental activities (such as the foundations of MNB), but 
not with regards to consumer prices. All in all, an across-the-board 
distortion of macro-trends seemed unlikely in an EU country watched 
by international institutions and analysists world-wide.  
The second line of objection attributed good figures to external 
factors. This position basically claims that Orbán and and the 
governor of MNB, György Matolcsy just got lucky with a low interest 
rate international environment which allows keeping borrowing costs 
low and the domestic economy humming. Having said that, 6 years 
of steady growth was last sighted in the first half of the 2000s and 
the U.S.-China trade war or Brexit did not exactly allow for an optimal 
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global background. The inflation and short term growth figures have 
much to do with government policy (VAT reduction for milk, fighting 
tax evasion, allocating EU funds to construction projects, just to 
name a few), and unemployment plunged to a historic low both due 
to the workfare approach and robust economic expansion. Deficit 
and government debt was also kept in check with a deliberate effort 
with the goal of keeping the country out of the excessive deficit 
procedure (and, therefore, minimizing the authority of Brussels over 
Hungarian fiscal policy).
Thirdly, detractors of government statistics point to regional rivals 
with even better numbers. It is certainly true that for a former poster 
child in the region Hungarian GDP per capita (on purchasing power 
parity) was only 70% of the EU28 average while Czechia posted 90% 
and even Slovakia did better with 78%. But it would be also difficult 
to deny that real GDP growth was most robust in Hungary in the 
Visegrád 4 during 2018-2019. 
But it is a fourth contention that cuts deepest into the reality of 
the Orbán regime. In its purest it can be summed up with two 
words: who cares? In this view, macroeconomic trends disguise 
the developments in the social sphere that matter the most. The 
progressive position is clear in this respect: Hungary under Orbán 
only does well when measured with a failed set of indicators. 
Although these describe positive developments in the Hungarian 
economy, such as larger and better paid workforce, they do 
not cover at least the two crucial challenges of 21st century 
economic development: human capital and the climate (see the 
chapter on Social reality below). 
Disunity in economic policy leadership with 
regards to the euro
In 2019, the issue of eurozone integration generated a rare sighting of 
cracks in the unity of the economic policy leadership of the government. 
Viktor Orbán, a lawyer by profession, has traditionally relied on outside 
expertise when forming economic policy. The appointment of Matolcsy 
as governor of the Hungarian National Bank (MNB) in 2013 has created 
a new dynamic in Fidesz economic policy circles: formally independent, 
Matolcsy has started to venture beyond the traditional confines of 
monetary policy. He created a network of foundations, established 
a university department and sponsors media outlets which properly 
appreciate the effectiveness of Hungarian monetary policy. All this 
served as a springboard for propagating his grand strategy, one of 
geopolitics, a global reorientation towards the East (“this is a new yin/
yang world”) and a rewiring of the domestic economy towards the 
realities of the 21st century.
The underlying differences in economic philosophy and demeanor 
came to the fore with a series of blog entries and public speeches by 
the central bank governor. In these, Matolcsy deemed the concept 
of the common European currency a failure, built on harmful political 
preconceptions. Fast forward to 2019 and, according to Matolcsy, the 
former European dream of becoming a global superpower has been 
„killed by Brexit, migration policies, the euro, the stopping of further 
accessions to the EU, austerity policies and the weaknesses of the 
single market.” This narrative of decline is contrasted by one of an 
emerging „Eurasia”. 
These utterances by Matolcsy prompted the Minister of Finance 
Mihály Varga to intervene both verbally (“the euro is a promising, if 
unfinished, project”) and on social media, where he posted a picture 
of Christine Lagarde, the newly appointed head of the European 
Central Bank, along with a note confirming that he is happy with 
the job she was doing in maintaining the value of the euro. In a 
response, titled Maastricht 2.0, the governor backtracked a bit by 
asserting that the eurozone must be reformed, but not necessarily 
discontinued. This intra-Fidesz bickering took place against the 
background of a Hungarian forint losing 10 per cent of its value 
vis-á-vis the euro in less than two years (although historically low 
interest rates may have had a more pronounced impact on the 
exchange rate than this affair). In contrast to the issue of the euro, 
in terms of the forint exchange rate it was Matolcsy whose policies 
prevailed.
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All in all, the controversy points toward the traditional bricolage 
approach to policy-making in the Orbán-governments: there are 
always multiple, separate, and sometimes conflicting, streams 
leading up to an eventual decision. Policies are chosen in a voluntary 
manner, sometimes neoliberal (such as the flat income tax), 
sometimes statist (see the heavy regulation and centralization in 
social policy). Orbán likes to keep his options open, both in terms of 
staffing and substance. Plausible deniability (“no one really meant to 
stay away from the eurozone over the long term”) is especially key 
in international interactions. And the two-headed economic policy 
leadership allows ample room for manoeuvring, even if it comes at 
the cost of some public discord.
Preparing for the crisis with the Economy 
Protection Action Plan?
Varga and Matolcsy also clashed on their assessment of the outlook 
for Hungarian growth. At an annual gathering of economists the 
finance minister considered that the economy’s “golden age” was 
coming to an end due to an external slowdown. Matolcsy, for his part, 
begged to differ and wrote “golden age isn’t over, it’s just beginning 
… and will last for decades”. The central bank governor was also 
unhappy with Varga’s demand for a “stable” forint, as MNB only 
targeted inflation, not the exchange rate. “Why shouldn’t one doubt 
the words of a finance minister if they go against the desires of the 
nation and the plans of the government in office?” wrote Matolcsy in 
his usual grandstanding style.
Yet alarming signs of a downturn in the EU economy for 2020 
dominated the news in late 2019. The average real GDP growth 
of eurozone countries was stagnating with 0.2% registered in the 
second quarter and the outlook for the next year looked similarly 
grim with a yearly average of 1.2 per cent. The gloomy reality of major 
industrial powers, such as Germany and Italy, suffering an even more 
pronounced slowdown created angst in the heavily export-oriented 
economies of many Eastern European countries. German industrial 
production hit a ten-year low in October 2019, with a contraction 
of 5.3 per cent over the base. The usual geopolitical risk factors of 
Brexit, the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China weighed 
heavily on manufacturing in Europe’s economic powerhouse.
Despite the optimism of the central bank, the Hungarian government 
went to great lengths to prepare for a possible downturn. As always, 
the policy proposals were packaged for the broadest of audiences, and 
a new round of the “Economy Protection Action Plan” came into being 
with the explicit aim of maintaining a 2 per cent growth advantage 
over the EU average. Many items of the Action Plan focused on 
maintaining a high level of employment. The reduction of the employer 
social security contribution continued with a 2 percentage point cut. 
Tourism, a key sector with major investments from known associates 
of the Fidesz government, was assigned to the lowest, 5 per cent VAT 
category which, even with the expansion of the tourism development 
contribution, cut the relevant tax rate in half. Other strategic branches 
of the economy such as construction and agriculture also received 
extra aid. Around 60 per cent of EU funds were also directed towards 
the economy, a result of a strategic shift over pre-2010 governments. 
In sum, while government and central bank estimations differed 
in terms of the potential impact of the German and EU-wide 
manufacturing, the aforementioned measures offered a buffer 
against the decrease of demand from Western European partners, 
at least in the short run. Nevertheless, these mostly cosmetic 
interventions would not have fully prepared the Hungarian economy 
for a more protracted period of slow growth in Europe. 
A Celtic Tiger on the shores of the Danube?
The key to the creation of a more crisis-proof domestic economy 
was related to diversification and moving away from a dominantly 
export-led growth model. Such a reorientation was not high on the 
agenda during the era of the second and third Orbán-government 
(2010-2018). However, with the emergence of a third strong man in 
economic policy, broadly conceived, besides Varga and Matolcsy, a 
partial change of direction took place. 
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László Palkovics, a former mechanical engineer at a multinational 
vendor of electronic brakes, joined the government as a state 
secretary for higher education in 2014. Over time, primary and 
secondary education was also added to his portfolio and in 2018 
he was appointed as minister for innovation and technology (this 
title came with a telling rebranding of the erstwhile Ministry of 
National Development). Palkovics made his name in Fidesz circles 
as an enforcer for the overhaul of the educational system. While the 
compulsory school-leaving age had been lowered from 18 to 16 back 
in 2011, years before he came into office, Palkovics proved himself 
to be capable in implementing the policy which re-oriented students 
from upper secondary general high schools to vocational training and 
the labor market. 
The creation of the Innovation Ministry signalled a wind of change 
in terms of the intended developmental model for Hungary. Under 
the old regime of the previous two Orbán governments, Hungary 
was to provide a fairly high-skilled workforce and a lax regulatory 
environment for multinational industrial companies, whereas 
utilities and services – with the major exception of retail – were 
either nationalized or firmly regulated. The first pillar of export-
oriented multinational enclaves was subsidized by ever-increasing 
handouts per jobs created (which reached a record of €40000 per 
job in 2019 according to press calculations). In the second pillar a 
newly created national bourgeoisie was gaining ground with the 
help of government-backed loans. The service sectors, such as 
tourism or banking, were mostly controlled by this bourgeoisie and 
were catering for domestic consumers who enjoyed a higher than 
average real wage growth by Hungarian standards (and therefore: 
spending power). Although this parallel did not appear in official 
communication, the new model more closely reflects that of post-
1990s Irish economy (the “Celtic Tiger”) than that of an “assembly-
plant” country somewhere in South-East Asia. This approach pairs 
single digit corporate taxation and incentives to attract FDI with 
a fascination with high added value and FDI in high-tech sectors 
and a social pact with workers. Stable macroeconomic policies, EU 
funds and access to the European single market all played a role, 
as did a sharp rise in workforce participation. In the first phase of 
the Irish “miracle” relatively low-wages and labor market flexibility 
were more important factors of competitive advantage than an 
investment in education and training (which in later phases allowed 
for the sustainability of high growth rates). 
Most of these elements were present in the reorientation of 
economic strategy in Hungary. We already touched on many of these 
components (such as low corporate taxation and job subsidies). In 
Hungary, the social pact took the form of the 6-year wage agreement 
reached between social partners in 2016. This allowed for a gradual 
increase of the minimum wage and a reduction of employer social 
security contributions indexed to average and real wage growth.
Industry 4.0 has become a buzzword in government documents, 
and a test track for self-driving cars in Zalaegerszeg, a town near 
the Austrian border, was hailed as a major achievement. Palkovics 
even maintained an office in Debrecen, the second most populous 
city in Hungary, to keep an eye on the site where a new car plant 
by BMW was under construction. Artificial Intelligence was also 
hyped as a potential area for breakthrough: the minister set the 
target for engaging no less than one million people (more than 
10% of total population) with basic training in the new technology. 
Research and development received a nominal extra 20% of funds 
in the annual budget for 2020 and Corvinus University, a traditional 
institute of higher education catering to the children of the elite, 
was reorganized into a foundation with the aim of attracting top 
quality scientific talent and students from around the world.
Despite these positive developments, the earnestness of this 
metamorphosis is at least questionable as, in all probability, the 
government was trying to kill two birds with one stone. Forcing 
CEU, the pre-eminent research institution in the land, out of the 
country for political reasons certainly did not contribute to the 
stated aim of convincing world-class researchers to conduct their 
projects in Budapest, neither did the de facto nationalization of 
the research network of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Both 
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cases smacked of a crack-down on independent researchers who 
criticized government policies home and abroad. A similarly politically 
motivated (if from a policy standpoint: somewhat justified) mega-
fine on Facebook revealed that the “Hungarian Tiger cub” may take 
some more time to grow up.
A belated strategy for SMEs 
The role of domestic small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in 
these grand schemes has traditionally remained unclear. That is 
not to say that business development agencies did not function, or 
that sizeable funds, both state and EU, were not directed towards 
the sector. It would also be unwise to negate the role of SMEs in the 
economy in general. This sphere accounted for more than half of GDP 
and employed two-thirds of the active labour force. More than 99.8% 
of the 724 000 registered companies in Hungary were SMEs. Over the 
past decade, productivity also increased vis-á-vis other segments of 
the domestic economy and also the EU28 average. However, in terms 
of both value added and productivity, the sector still lagged behind 
relevant benchmarks. 
Many problems plagued SMEs since the regime change of 1990. 
In the first phase, in the 1990s, SMEs were synonymous with the 
forced self-employment of workers laid off at socialist factories. 
Government figures revealed heavy inequalities in the regional 
composition of growth potential. Home-grown enterprises had 
seldom success with their own products on global markets and if 
they did, as was with the case of Prezi, a presentation software, or 
NNG, a navigation company, it was not primarily due to supportive 
public policy initiatives. In general, Hungarian SMEs have been lagging 
behind in the digital economy, which may also be due to the fact that 
many companies are still led by their founders, many of whom are in 
their sixties or older. 
Furthermore, horror stories abound when it comes to the misuse of 
public money in business development. In the matter of just a few 
days in December 2019, two emblematic reports appeared in the 
Hungarian press. One was on the Ministry of Finance using almost 
all funds from a small business aid call on two of its own affiliates 
which were busy renovating the new headquarters of said ministry. 
The second one concerned not-so petty corruption: a former vice-
president of the Szolnok county council, and a right-hand woman of the 
local Fidesz MP, was detained on charges related to the “channelling” 
and eventual embezzlement of EU funds. This story was one of many 
similar on regional Fidesz strongmen working the system to their 
own benefit. The list goes on with, for instance, the questionable use 
of government-backed venture capital schemes. All in all, Hungarian 
SMEs remained underdeveloped in international comparison despite 
the efforts and funding by consecutive governments. Similarly, 
despite their large share of output and employment, they did not 
serve as a backbone in the Hungarian economy. 
The government admitted as much by drafting a new strategic 
document for the development of the sector for the period 2019-
2030. Besides offering tax breaks, the baseline solution to virtually 
any problem that government policy-makers faced in the Orbán-
era, the reduction of administrative burdens was also highlighted. 
But the thrust of the white paper was aimed at digitalization and 
international competitiveness, without question two major areas for 
improvement. 
The Economic Protection Action Plan also contained multiple 
measures directly aimed at improving the general conditions and 
also the cash-flow of SMEs. Loan guarantees were extended, minor 
cuts to the tax rate for special groups were implemented. The date 
of corporate tax payment was moved down 5 months, leaving €500 
million in positive cash-flow at around 40 000 firms as a one-time 
effect. Tax breaks for innovation were also expanded as were funds 
for the creation of worker-accommodations. Yet despite the renewed 
focus on the sector, it is difficult to look beyond the fact that 9 years 
have passed with no evident progress in terms of closing the gap for 
SMEs as a whole in comparison to both Western Europe and even 
some countries in the region (see the aforementioned trends in GDP 
per capita).
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Persistent problems hallmarked the social reality of 2019 in Hungary 
from health care to inequalities and deprivation. A government 
proposal to restrict access to health services for those with over 
three months of unpaid contributions potentially jeopardizes 700 
thousand people and has come in a situation in which Hungary has 
been already among the EU countries with the worst record for the 
share of deprivation in the population. 
Substantial real wage growth coupled with 
mid-range inequality
Real wage growth continued at a fast pace in 2019, although the over 
10% rate of 2017 looked now firmly a thing of the past. Based on the 
latest available data of a 10.8% year-on-year increase in the average 
gross wage in September 2019 and an expected inflation rate of 
around 3.4 per cent, analyst estimations for real wage expansion 
were in the range of 6-7 per cent. The current two-year plan of the 
general six-year wage agreement sanctioned an increase of 8 per 
cent for both 2019 and 2020, which proved to be a major factor in 
pushing salaries up. 
According to official numbers, income inequality slightly decreased 
from 2017 to 2018 (the last available data). Net income inequality 
between the highest and lowest decile dropped from 8.2 to 7.8 (i.e. the 
best positioned families enjoyed an income 8 times higher than those 
of the impoverished households). The Gini coefficient, a widely used 
measure of income inequity, was 0.7 point lower than the 2017 level 
of 28.7. These figures put Hungary in the mid-section of the EU28 
inequality chart. In contrast, the similarly frequently cited measure of 
the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population with 
the highest income to that received by the 20% of the population with 
the lowest income (S80/S20) showed a slight increase for Hungary, 
from 4.3 to 4.4. This was still below the EU average of 5.2 although 
worse than the statistics for neighboring Slovakia and Slovenia, or 
those of Czechia and Poland. 
In terms of regional disparity, the per capita income gap was the 
largest between Budapest (the wealthiest region) and the Northern 
Great Plain area (the poorest). The respective inequality figure barely 
decreased (from a ratio of 1.6 to 1.5), meaning that the average 
household in Budapest commanded an income 50 to 60 per cent 
higher than one in the Eastern countryside. Recently, two distinct 
phenomena have characterized Hungary’s territorial development: 
the declining performance of Budapest, which is the country’s 
economic powerhouse, and the widening gap between the FDI-rich, 
industrialized regions and the rural areas. While overall inequality 
has somewhat decreased because of the capital city’s recent inferior 
growth performance, there is an ongoing process of economic 
divergence between the catching-up and the lagging regions.
Despite substantial economic growth, almost a third of Hungarian 
citizens still live in deprivation. This is the fourth worst figure in 
the entire EU, behind Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, and puts into 
perspective the success narrative of the government. It also reflects 
on its priorities: as poverty remained rampant it spent €100 million 
on moving the chancellery and €150 million for relocating the finance 
ministry to the Castle District in Buda. 
Neglected health care comes back to haunt 
the government
During the year, slowly but surely, the problems of health care crept 
ever higher on the public policy agenda. One of the symptoms of 
the chronic underfinancing of the state health system was that 
4.2  Social reality
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the government was only ready to cover around 60 per cent of the 
€200 million outstanding debt owed to health care providers. The 
new “brown lamp rule” was one of these major items. For anyone 
with no employment contract or state coverage (such as those for 
students) “free” health care services in the state system are only 
available for a fee of €20 or so. In the past this could be covered on 
site when someone turned up for an appointment (after a red light 
in the computer system prompted the provider to ask for a proof 
of coverage), or let the tax agency collect it in an administrative 
procedure. In the future, anyone with no ongoing health care 
coverage will receive a brown light, meaning that a cash payment will 
be requested not for the monthly coverage, but the actual cost of the 
treatment. 
This measure may impact over 10% of the population and could 
possibly lead to a U.S.-style dynamics in which those with no 
insurance end up in emergency rooms and exorbitant bills to cover 
post-treatment. The reform has also created a new social security 
contribution by merging two previous health care contributions, a 
pension and a labour market premium. This decision also dismissed 
any semblance that employees had a direct claim on their own future 
pension via a private virtual account (a major promise of Fidesz at a 
time when the government more or less “nationalized” the private 
pension pillar). 
News of plans of closing down divisions in rural hospitals, such 
as the one in Dunaújváros, a town of around 50 thousand, were 
circulated based on internal government documents. In some cases 
the shortage of doctors has already led to a de facto suspension 
of the provision of services for outpatient care. Yet the prospect of 
travelling 50 kilometres for a routine check-up by a specialist caused 
concerns in the municipalities on the list. Furthermore, mice and 
cockroaches running around in medical centres and public calls for 
toiletries betrayed a third-world level of infrastructure in at least 
some facilities. It should not come as a surprise, that after 16 years 
the reigning head of the medical chamber was removed and a new, 
reform-minded chairman was elected. 
It was also no coincidence that one of the most memorable pledges 
of Gergely Karácsony, the eventually successful opposition candidate 
for the mayoral election of Budapest, focused on procuring more 
computer tomography (CT) machines for underserviced districts 
of the capital. In fact, he made the organization of the 2023 World 
Athletics Championship (and the construction of a new stadium for 
that purpose) conditional on €150 million in government support for a 
rejuvenation of health care in the city. This was a welcome concession 
on behalf of a government which only spent 6.6 per cent of GDP on 
public health, one of the worst such figure in the OECD.
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Until the potential success of the aforementioned large-scale re-
purposing strategy of the Hungarian economy towards a high-added 
value and digital model, the short-term outlook for 2020 offers 
more of the same with some cooling off in an overheated economy. 
In the given structure – that is: both export-oriented and domestic 
consumption-based growth model – the economy came to its full 
potential in 2018-2019. This has been reflected in GDP growth 
surpassing the long-term growth potential, as well as high industrial 
capacity utilization and substantial real wage increases.
The year 2020 may provide a turning point for the extant Hungarian 
developmental model in multiple respects. First, the global slowdown 
may constrain one of the key sources of growth: a major automobile 
cluster with multiple ongoing new plant projects. Competitiveness 
rankings and statistical data describing the productivity of home-
grown SMEs show an unflattering image and cast a doubt as to 
which sector may cover the lost growth realized at multinationals 
targeting global markets. 
Second, fiscal sustainability was only feasible in the past decade 
due to the influx of EU development funds. According to statistics 
published by MNB, the effective utilization of cohesion and structural 
subsidies ranged from a 2 to 8 per cent of GDP on a yearly basis 
between 2013 and 2018. The projection for this rate is below 4 and 3 
per cent for 2020 and 2021, respectively. It is notable, that the Orbán 
government opted out of the agreement establishing a new European 
Public Prosecutor Office, and treats cases opened by the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as infringements on national sovereignty. 
Considering these issues and the ongoing Article 7 procedure with 
regards to the rule of law in Hungary, and also efforts by Western 
and Northern European governments to tie this procedure to the 
allocation of EU funds entails significant risk even for these moderate 
estimations. 
This is not to say that the prime minister has no bargaining chips in 
the negotiations. As the example of the von der Leyen proposal for 
the Green Deal showed, Hungary can in fact extract concessions from 
Western partners in exchange for approving even uncontroversial 
decisions (in the event, only Poland held out of a joint declaration). 
The medium term outlook for economic growth is thoroughly 
dependent on the outcome of the EU budget negotiations. Therefore, 
a major reduction in development funds would either make the 
fiscally conservative stance untenable or, given the government’s 
well known priorities, would lead to an even more severe degradation 
of social services.
A third, and related, risk factor is that as investments scale down 
either because of a global recession or a reduction of development 
assistance, the economy falls below its long-term potential. News 
reports already point towards a petering out of labour demand, even 
as a few additional years of substantial real wage growth may be on 
the cards as the labour market adjusts. These developments will make 
future tax cuts (the Swiss army knife of Orbán governments as it was 
applied to a wide variety of problems ranging from competitiveness 
to the low purchasing power of families) less likely. In the context of 
these intertwined trends, the aforementioned strategic reorientation 
towards innovation and a high-added value economy looks a sensible 
option (notwithstanding the worrying developments in the field of 
higher education and science). 
4.3  Economic outlook for 2020 – thoroughly 
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As for the short term outlook, the projections by international 
organizations for key macro indicators paint a similar picture. Our 
survey of the reports published by the European Commission, the 
OECD and the IMF shows that real GDP is expected to grow by 2.8-
3.3% in 2020. This would entail a 1.5-1.8 percentage point drop on a 
yearly basis, something that government and MNB projections debate 
(and, at least for 2019, these latter proved to be more accurate). With 
a return to moderate expansion, inflation is set to decrease to around 
3.1-3.4 per cent while unemployment keeps steady at 3.4 per cent. 
International organizations are optimistic about budgetary and debt 
trends, with a projected public budget balance of -1.0 per cent of GDP. 
The current account balance will stay in negative territory for the 
foreseeable future according to these reports.







As thick as this year was with political news and elections, one of 
the striking features of 2019 was the lack of major changes in the 
media market and in media regulations. The annual Soft Censorship 
report of the media watchdog NGO Mérték Media Monitor noted that 
“despite the fact that it could do so at any time, since the elections 
of April 2018 Fidesz has not used its two-thirds supermajority in 
the Hungarian parliament, the National Assembly, to amend the 
media laws”. In a sense, after years of major upheaval wrought by 
the departure of Hungary’s erstwhile largest media oligarch, Lajos 
Simicska, from the pro-Fidesz camp, the media situation has come 
to a fragile equilibrium of sorts. 
The unexpected consolidation at the end of 2018 of the almost 
entire privately-held Fidesz media empire into one massive media 
conglomerate comprising almost 500 media outlets did not change 
much in practice, but it did change a lot in terms of the how the picture 
looked. Previously, critics of Fidesz’s media policies had argued that 
these disparate media outlets essentially belonged to the same “club” 
– no matter who their official owners were. The owners’ “voluntary” 
forfeiture of their private property gave a legal imprimatur to the 
widespread assumption that they were in fact owned by a single source. 
And while the governing party has still not been officially inscribed as 
the beneficial owner, everything about the Central European Press and 
Media Foundation (KESMA) makes clear that it is a Fidesz-controlled 
institution, a fact that neither the ruling party’s politicians nor the 
media workers themselves deny at this point. 
But since 2019 was a comparatively calm year as compared to the 
foregoing period, it is a good point to take stock and review some key 
insights from how this temporarily consolidated system has played 
out. And as the starting point of this analysis, it is worth noting that 
one of the reasons why Fidesz did not intervene as heavily in the 
media market last year as before was that for the first time in years 
it seemed reasonably satisfied already with the way that the media 
market works – with good reason.  
Finally ‘balanced’?
After nine successive years in office – and 13 years overall since 
regime transition – Prime Minister Viktor Orbán finally found that 
the Hungarian media landscape had become “balanced”. Following 
decades of carping about a real and then a presumed left-liberal 
dominance in the media, Orbán at one point acknowledged that there 
is now a rough “parity” in the Hungarian media. Needless to say, 
that is not in line with the reality perceived either by the opposition, 
independent NGOs and observers or, in fact, anyone outside Fidesz. 
Media watchdogs in particular find that there is an overwhelming 
and growing dominance of pro-government media, which is stifling 
critical discourse and distorts the free process of opinion formation 
which democracy needs to operate. 
It is difficult to exactly measure just how much massive the 
government’s dominance in the media is. Various NGOs (including 
the media watchdog Mérték and the investigative site Átlátszó) 
have tried to operationalise this, but they ran into limits both 
because of lacking data and the difficulty of capturing the various 
ways in which dominance can be measured. Nevertheless, no 
matter what approach has been tried thus far, the number 
of media outlets, their reach, media consumption patterns, 
advertising volumes or state advertising (which is a crucial slice of 
the advertising market in the relatively small national market), the 
result has always been that Fidesz controls a far greater portion 
5.1  Between storms 
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of the media landscape than the “opposition media”. The latter is 
Fidesz’s umbrella term for every media outlet whose coverage is 
not completely aligned with the government’s own perspective, 
from independent media over ideologically-aligned media all the 
way to partisan media outlets. 
A hamstrung officially tolerated non-Fidesz 
media
With respect to government advertising, the dominance of pro-
government media (which can only be estimated because the 
government does not publish much of the relevant information), 
is estimated to be as high as 80% by Mérték (for state advertising 
trends see Graph 1). But it bears pointing out that whatever money 
is spent by the government or by government-owned corporations 
on advertising in independent, critical or opposition media – which 
is but a small fraction of the total government media spending – is 
mostly given only to media outlets that conform to some ground 
rules and either avoid certain lines of inquiry and/or agree with the 
government on certain key issues. The publicly professed critical 
attitudes of the owners of Hungary’s sole critical news channel, 
ATV, about migration and homosexuality, are a case in point.
Graph 1. State advertising expenditures in Hungary, 2006-2018
Source: Attila Bátorfy, ATLO Team, https://atlo.team/allamihirdetesek/  
Note: Yellow: Pro-Fidesz, Blue: Not Pro-Fidesz
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At this point two vital remaining critical outlets, ATV and the weekly 
newspaper 168 óra, are owned by small churches (an evangelical and 
a Jewish congregation, respectively) whose thinking hews close to 
the government on a variety of political issues. And even though in 
this context it is only fair to acknowledge that their interventions in 
editorial policy are not blatant and heavy-handed, the coverages of 
these still-critical media outlets have indeed shifted in recent years.
Capturing what’s missing: rural dwellings 
and the elderly
This adds nuance to the question of what the media balance in 
Hungary looks like, since even if Viktor Orbán’s idea of a media 
market parity were correct based on figures (and it is not), if some 
of the critical media are effectively muzzled with the leverage 
of state advertising then that would still not imply that the 
market is actually divided 50-50. But to add further nuance, it 
may be helpful to conceptualise the media market in a way that 
the existing surveys did not because it is even more difficult to 
quantify. A highly relevant dimension of our understanding of the 
media market constellation pertains to the question of where 
independent or opposition media do not reach, be it geographically 
or demographically. No matter what the national balance is like, 
if there are areas or segments of the market or the population 
where no independent information reaches, that can result in 
massive distortions of the public sphere.
Looking at the market by segments and regions, two vital facts 
stand out. The entire market for regional print newspapers includes 
no independent or opposition media whatsoever. Furthermore, 
there are also no independent and opposition media outlets in the 
national radio market. In fact, the only major critical radio in Hungary, 
Klubrádió, was deprived of its rural frequencies and is limited to 
broadcasting to the choir in Budapest. 
It is also important to note that although these are legacy media, 
they still matter in Hungary. Within the declining print segment, 
regional newspapers are far more likely to be read in large swathes 
of rural Hungary than national newspapers. Radio, too, is still 
widely listened to by millions of Hungarians, especially among the 
elderly, who are overrepresented in both rural populations and 
among active voters. Viewed in conjunction with the fact that the 
national print media hardly reach outside major urban areas, this 
suggests that much of rural Hungary and large segments of the 
elderly population have little access to information that has not 
been “curated” by the government and its media reviewers, as the 
news disseminated by both the public media and the vast private 
Fidesz media empire invariably are. 
Information and voting – two hypotheses
This is just a hypothesis, but given what we know about media 
consumption patterns and voting behaviour, it is one worth 
investigating: if one were to superimpose a given region’s diversity 
of media sources onto an electoral map of the municipal election of 
2019, which resulted in the first significant gains by the opposition 
since Fidesz acceded to power in 2010,  one would find that the lack 
of alternatives to the news propagated by pro-government media 
correlated very heavily with the massive margins that Fidesz racked 
up in most rural areas. 
If this hypothesis is true and we complement it with another 
hypothesis, namely that the correlation is also partly causally 
explained by Fidesz’s media dominance, which effectively constitutes 
a near monopoly on information in some vital segments of the 
electorate (elderly rural voters in particular), then the message for 
Fidesz is contradictory. On the one hand, it suggests that their general 
strategic approach to the media issue is correct. The better they are 
at controlling the news and information that a given segment of the 
population can access, the more likely they are to win their vote. At 
the same time, Fidesz’s local election failures in major parts of urban 
Hungary suggest that their losses owed in part to the governing 
party’s inability to expand their control over the media consumption 
of the urban public.




Whether Fidesz shares this insight and how it reacts to it will have a 
crucial impact on the government’s media policies in the coming years. 
Even if Viktor Orbán and Fidesz were to decide that the basic idea 
underlying their aggressive media policy was basically the right idea 
despite the electoral setback the party suffered in October 2019, they 
might nevertheless opt to leave things as they are. For the fact is that the 
geographical areas and numbers of voters won by the governing party 
would be enough for a parliamentary majority in 2022 – theoretically. 
In practice, Fidesz is not known for assuming that it can coast to 
victory. Furthermore, there is the risk that an economic downturn 
may lead to a broader disenchantment with the government which 
could make the existing media control in rural areas insufficient for 
holding on to all of the rural regions that make up Fidesz’s electoral 
firewall. As we said previously, Fidesz argued correctly about the 
municipal election that if the results were extrapolated to a national 
election, the outcome of the municipal election would still yield a 
diminished but stable Fidesz majority. But seeing as its buffer has 
shrunk considerably as compared to April 2018, this means that 
the governing party can ill afford to lose many more constituencies 
without forfeiting its majority in parliament.
For non-Fidesz aligned media, more 
pressure likely ahead
Thus, even though some in Fidesz’s position might argue to leave 
good enough alone and to focus on other issues instead, the 
governing party is more likely to take further steps towards increasing 
its dominance in the media. There is a thought-out and effective 
strategy behind Fidesz’s media policy (as in most areas concerning 
political control), even if this strategy has little to do with what is 
considered acceptable in a democratic or rule-of-law framework. And 
even while 2019 was a relatively mellow year overall, underneath the 
relative stability in the media market the quiet progress towards 
Fidesz media control has continued. 
Consider the often awful financial state of non-Fidesz media, 
which are mostly deprived of access to domestic advertisers who 
fear official retribution, while they are also often not attractive 
enough to large multinational corporations whose economic 
role makes them unconcerned about the Orbán government’s 
revenge. Large multinational corporations – which make their 
advertising decisions based on cost-effectiveness considerations 
rather than political goals – still play a key role in sustaining the 
most successful independent and critical media outlets, such as 
for example the online newspapers Index.hu, 24.hu, 444.hu, not to 
mention the commercial TV channel RTL Klub. The latter continues 
to present some critical reports that would be otherwise unseen on 
Hungarian television, which makes the television channel the only 
media outlet that provides some limited real information about 
Hungary to some segments of the rural and elderly population who 
have little access to other sources of critical coverage about the 
government’s activities.
Drowning in a lack of funding
Fidesz’s long-game of quietly financially suffocating at least the 
most vulnerable segments of the non-Fidesz media may be paying 
off in ways that are not immediately apparent since the media 
outlets continue to persist. But the lack of advertising, subscribers 
or other reliable access to funding is proving an increasing strain 
on the non-Fidesz media, and many outlets are either operating 
on a shoestring budget or teeter on the edge of bankruptcy. The 
abovementioned 168 óra weekly, owned by the Jewish ultra-
orthodox congregation Chabad, regularly fails to pay its journalists 
on time, which has a massive negative impact on employee morale. 
The weekly’s editor-in-chief and his deputy, two prominent 
Hungarian journalists whose work probably did a lot to inspire 
confidence among the readers despite their misgivings about the 
fact that the paper is now owned by a pro-Fidesz group, have 
recently called in quits. So one of the remaining flagship non-Fidesz 
weekly newspapers is near extinction level. It seems unlikely that a 
newspaper that is critical of the government can be operated in the 
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long-term against the interests of its owners, and the fact that the 
latter often fail to pay the staff for extended periods suggests that 
this arrangement is peculiar for both sides. 
Thus, even without further government intervention, some non-
Fidesz media will probably not make it through 2022, owing to the 
effectiveness of the policies that have cut off their access to funding. 
But the odds are that there will be further interventions, and the 
decision by the National Assembly to effectively make it impossible for 
reporters covering Parliament to interview politicians in the building 
suggests that the government is very much open to the possibility that 
it must accelerate its plan against all efforts to inform the public.  
For the opposition, it follows that they must find ways to invest in 
informing those segments of the population whom the government has 
cut off from all media sources but their own. Finding practical ways of 
doing that without access to either television or radio, not to mention 
money, will be hard, however.  One possibility is that the victory in the 
municipal election might loosen the purses of wealthy donors who now 
perceive a real possibility of ousting Fidesz in the next election. Yet, giving 
money to critical media invites attention from the government that few 
if any of the superrich in Hungary would like to endure. 
If democracy operated normally, figuring out how to attract massive 
investments into the media would not even be a job that politicians 
ought to be thinking about. But the Fidesz-generated reality is that 
investing in public affairs journalism does not beckon with any hope 
of making money, which means there is obviously no reason for 
business-oriented market players to invest in the Hungarian market. 
Given that volunteer journalism can only go so far in making the 
playing field slightly less unequal, the Hungarian paradox created by 
the ruling party is that even as the opposition rightfully bemoans the 
government’s heavy-handed interventions in the media market, if they 
want to be electorally competitive they will likely see no alternative 
to getting in the media business themselves. Thus, the excessive 
partisan polarisation that Fidesz had always (mostly falsely) accused 
the Hungarian media market of may indeed become a reality.
Months of wrangling and negotiations about the fate of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (abbreviated as MTA in Hungarian) 
ultimately resulted in what many assumed would be the outcome 
from the very start. Fidesz used its constitutional supermajority to 
take the entire research network of MTA away from the Academy 
and fully subordinate it to the new Eötvös Loránd Research Network 
(ELKH). This new organisation now directly controls the nation’s 
largest scientific network comprising a staff of ca. 5,000 persons 
overall, including thousands of scientists, and will get to use the 
Academy’s properties without remuneration. The ELKH is controlled 
by a 13-member governing board with six delegates of the Academy 
and six of the Government, and a President. As all decisions require 
a simple majority, the Academy’s delegates have little chance to go 
against the will of government delegates. 
More control over scientific research
It is worthwhile to quickly review the theories that have been 
advanced why the government wants to control such a big chunk 
of scientific research in Hungary despite the fact that ostensible 
political benefits are rather slim. The assault on MTA in fact even cost 
Fidesz substantial portions of its already diminished support among 
intellectuals. The government’s actual motives remain unclear, but 
the ostensible reason provided was that they want more emphasis 
on practical research that yields tangible benefits in the realm of the 
economy, while they want less theoretical/foundational research 
that cannot be converted into GDP. That may actually be part of the 
5.2  In culture and 
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motivation, even though critics with a background in science counter 
that without foundational research to precede it, applied research 
does not have a leg to stand on.  
Many suspect, however, that the publicly presented reasons do not 
reflect the real motivations behind the government’s subjugation of 
the MTA. According to a theory, the ultimate answer leads back to 
money. According to this school of thought, the Hungarian science 
network stands to receive massive EU funding in the coming years, 
which Fidesz was loath to leave outside of its grasp. Direct control over 
the Academy’s research network equals direct access to these funds. 
While that certainly meshes with the government’s overall approach, 
at the same time it is also worth pointing out that in terms of their total 
value, these are relatively small sums. Would Fidesz risk the political 
damage at the European level and in terms of its standing with the 
rightwing segments of the Hungarian intelligentsia for however much 
it can gain from a few ten billion HUF worth of science funding – which 
appears to be a rounding error when compared to projects such as the 
expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant (estimated to reach about 
3,000 billion HUF or 10% of Hungary’s annual GDP)?
Which brings us to the third hypothesis – and at this point it is worth 
pointing out that these explanations are not mutually exclusive, in 
fact they are likely to be complementary. It is possible that MTA has 
just fallen prey to Fidesz’s general desire to control all of public life, 
and especially institutions that previously operated autonomously 
and generated knowledge that might disagree with the government’s 
own views, values and political narrative. With its several thousands 
of scholars who research a host of issues from economics and history 
all the way to such egregious affronts to Fidesz’s sensibilities as 
gender studies, MTA has been one of the last vestiges of independent 
thinking in Hungary which produce knowledge that can run counter to 
Fidesz’s narrative even if it does not seek to dabble in politics at all. 
As in many other walks of life, the power of the purse and the control 
over the employment of the scholars may have a chilling effect on 
scientific research even if Fidesz were to decide to wield this power 
cautiously.
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Culture wars on
When changes in culture and science are discussed, one must 
remember Orbán’s proclamation of the culture wars in his annual 
Tusványos speech in 2018. “An era is determined by cultural trends, 
collective beliefs and social customs. This is now the task we are 
faced with: we must embed the political system in a cultural era,” 
Orbán said last year. His supporters have called for an end to what 
they see as the dominance in Hungarian culture of leftist-liberal ideas 
for years.
The fate of the 1956 Institute, an established research outfit with 
a small crew that focused on the history of communism and regime 
transition – from a critical perspective – has been mainly discussed 
in intellectual circles, but the ease with which the institution was 
flattened by the government steamroller was both symptomatic and 
disconcerting. The Institute’s director, János M. Rainer, a renowned 
scholar of communism only found out about the decision to integrate 
his institution into Veritas, the government’s own institute for 
Fidesz-aligned historiography, when friends began to call him about 
it. Rainer had no doubts as to what was going on: “What is happening 
to us is the same thing as what the government intends to do with 
the MTA research institutes. They need to trample anyone who is 
not part of their coterie, eradicating the small circles of liberty that 
remain.” All of the Institute’s staff heard Fidesz’s message loud and 
clear and resigned immediately or left the institute within weeks, 
arguing that Veritas was not a place where independent research 
could be performed. 
Hungarian government targets theatres as well
The last weeks of 2019 brought another episode of the culture 
wars. On 11 December the Hungarian government passed a bill in an 
accelerated process, with the aim to tighten control over theatres, 
a move that has triggered protests from actors and audiences who 
see artistic freedom under threat. According to the new law, which 
the government softened compared to an original version after the 
protests, Hungary’s minister for human resources, who oversees 
culture, will have a say in appointing theatre directors at institutions 
jointly financed by the state and municipalities. Fidesz MPs confirmed 
that the government seeks a greater say in the operation of theatres 
that it partly funds. They cited a recent sexual harassment case 
at a Budapest theatre as the reason of the changes, because the 
government currently has no power to sack the director of the 
theatre involved. 
To put this change in context, it must be added that few municipalities 
have the means to finance their theatres and often rely on 
government funds for their maintenance. In line with the new law, 
the minister and the relevant municipality now will have to sign a deal 
defining the joint operation of a theatre, including how to appoint its 
director. 
The new cultural law will also set up a National Cultural Council, 
which will be responsible for “setting priorities and directions to be 
followed in Hungarian culture”. The law says cultural organisations 
should “actively defend the interests of the nation’s wellbeing and 
development”.
The party with a plan
What is further striking about these changes is how they follow 
a similar blueprint. These stories tend to include a campaign of 
vilification in the rightwing media, including character assassinations. 
In terms of vilification, Fidesz’s former friends and its established 
“enemies” are treated differently, but they are attacked all the 
same: a whole series of Fidesz moderates have been targeted in the 
rightwing media as lacking the necessary zeal in purging leftwing and 
liberal influence from their own terrains or for failing to represent 
Fidesz’s partisan interests in a dogmatic enough manner. 
The overall trend is very clear. Fidesz is shedding itself of its moderate 
intellectuals, and the line of former high-level Fidesz moderates who 
have been relegated to the background or have even turned openly 
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critical of the party is growing. It includes once major figures such as 
the conservative economist Ákos Péter Bod, whom Fidesz nominated 
as its prime ministerial candidate in 2006 when it seemed Orbán 
would not be able to win the election; Géza Jeszenszky, a former 
foreign minister who was Hungary’s ambassador to Norway but was 
forced to resign when he could no longer follow the government’s 
anti-Norway communication stemming from Fidesz’s frustration of 
Norway’s support for independent civic organisations in Hungary; 
József Pálinkás, a prominent nuclear physicist who was Orbán’s 
education minister for a stretch during Orbán’s first term in office 
and was until recently in charge for representing the government’s 
goals at the MTA for a while; and Tamás Mellár, the former head of 
Hungary’s statistical office who was fired by the leftwing government 
for lacking in servility and found a job as a senior manager at the 
pro-Fidesz think-tank Századvég, from where he served Orbán as 
an economic advisor until his views were seen as incompatible with 
Fidesz’s policies (Mellár is now an opposition MP). 
What unites these men is that they have strong professional 
credentials, which takes precedence over Fidesz’s partisan agenda. 
The people who have come to replace them in the Fidesz-intelligensia 
usually also have a theme in common. They are persons with deeply-
held grudges against the real or perceived leftwing dominance in their 
respective fields, which is a wrong they desperately want to right. 
Control over resources
In assessing how important total control over resources is for the 
government, a key point of evidence is the political controversy 
surrounding the Norway NGO Grants. To wit, Norway pays a large 
subsidy to all Eastern European countries – Hungary among them 
– in exchange for access to the EU’s Common Market. A part of 
this package is subsidies for civil society in Hungary, a relatively 
small amount of money, roughly 10% of Norway’s 200 million euro 
spending in total. Yet the Fidesz government has been at odds 
with the Norwegian government over the insistence of the latter 
to allocate this small amount through independent NGOs rather 
than the government, which controls the distribution of the other 
subsidies. At this point, the position of the Hungarian government 
is that it would rather forgo all funding from Norway than to allow 
NGOs which it perceives as hostile to its political objectives to receive 
any funding. 
Looking at the issues above from this perspective, it does seem at 
least conceivable that when it comes to control over these relatively 
trifling sums the point is to make sure that no one who could be a 
source of critical views of government policy has access to funding. 
Moreover, this theory meshes not only with the evidence but also 
with Viktor Orbán’s own pronouncements on the culture wars. In this 
spirit, the culture war is not only on, but it is becoming increasingly 
intense, in which the goal is the destruction of any cultural and 
ideological models that could rival the governing party’s own.  
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Every indication is that Fidesz’s conservatism is going into overdrive 
as the desire to control all walks of social life moves from the 
political and economic sphere to the cultural and social. For lack of 
a better word, Viktor Orbán takes a holistic view of politics, where 
dominance in specific areas is not enough if it is not embedded in a 
broader framework of control. Hence, Fidesz’s outsize dominance 
in the political and economic realm, including a massive edge in the 
media market, is not seen as sufficient. The grand vision is for a more 
comprehensive control that will shape Hungary’s future and will 
cement the role of the Fidesz oligarchy (or “national elite”, as they 
would like to see themselves) within it, and that requires a control of 
culture, education and the social values that dominate large aspects 
of everyday life. 
At the end of 2019, the government whose head had promised to 
respect the voters’ decision to turn control of some municipalities – 
foremost Budapest – over to the national opposition, just announced 
that it wishes to practically take away the cities’ right to appoint 
the general managers of theatres. As the bill is already adopted, 
from now on the government will have a say in the appointment of 
theatre directors, unless the local governments decide to finance 
their theatres completely. This is neither the first nor the last blow 
to municipal autonomy since the opposition made significant gains 
in the local elections in October 2019, but it is not only a significant 
break with the publicly professed “respect” for the voters’ choice, it is 
also a vital manifestation of the desire to colonise the cultural realm. 
It would be impossible to select any random slice of the Hungarian 
population that is culturally more different from the Fidesz’s ideal 
in terms of their values and cultural preferences than the average 
Budapest theatre-goer. Fidesz now has decided to directly go after 
the liberal elite as it seems that the governing party no longer allows 
them to cosily cling to their cultural bubble amidst the growing 
authoritarianism around them. 
This is a battle cry in a war that Fidesz is vastly better equipped to win. 
The increasingly conservative slogans surrounding family policies 
and the shrill anti-gay pronouncements of senior Fidesz politicians 
should not be seen as random pronouncements on disparate 
subjects but as part of a broader strategy for the wholesale cultural 
transformation of Hungarian society. Whether the government will 
succeed or not is far too early to tell, but the policies of the coming 
year should be expected to be in line with this overarching strategy. 
There will be stricter control over all types of cultural contents and, 
while it seems outlandish to imagine for now, the discrimination of 
gays need not necessarily remain limited to rhetoric. 
Although a backlash is always possible – the municipal election and 
the urban vote, which also featured conservatives voting against 
Fidesz, were also a backlash against this type of policy – Fidesz has 
clearly decided that in the age of polarisation showing strength and 
shoring up the base are more relevant than currying favour with the 
urban intelligentsia. The next parliamentary election in 2022 will not 
be decided in Budapest and especially not by the theatre-goers in 
Budapest. 
The electorally vital rural folks who could swing the pendulum 
against Fidesz may not even hear such news in any relevant detail 
from the pro-government media that have a near monopoly in 
many rural media markets. And even if they do, they may well 
decide that although they might not have thought of such policies 
themselves, by and large such anti-elitist policies reflect their 
values and preferences. The question for Fidesz is whether they can 
reconcile the broader social policy approach with their welfare and 
other social policies, which overwhelmingly favour the urban upper 
classes while they offer little to nothing for the rural poor, who see 
their healthcare and education institutions vanish, and with it their 
future, too.
5.3  Outlook on the Hungarian society in 2020
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Conclusion
In many ways, 2019 was just another milestone in the long road 
of Fidesz’s efforts at building an illiberal regime in Hungary. From 
a long-term perspective, two spectacular things stand out about 
this year. First, the municipal elections showed that even within the 
shrinking space available to it, and despite the authoritarian squeeze 
of the various government agencies, the opposition can score some 
goals. Whether it can or will be allowed to do so at the national level 
is unclear. 
The other striking feature of 2019 is at the same time how effective 
the government’s media machinery has become. Wherever the 
government has succeeded at establishing near-monopolies on 
information, it has performed outstandingly with voters. In an ironic 
twist, the government’s defeat in many major urban municipalities 
– a result that was unexpected in its scope, even if the trend was 
discernible – could be seen as reinforcing Fidesz’s fundamental 
strategy of putting the control of information on the top of its agenda. 
Hungary is divided among many lines, but 2019 showed that in terms 
of how the government is viewed by voters, information may be one 
of the most vital issues. 
It is worthwhile to recall that similarly to 2019, 2018 went out with 
a bang, too, as the opposition successfully seized on the opening 
provided by the unpopular overtime law, which became colloquially 
known as the Slave Law – one of the few instances when the 
opposition managed to successfully frame the public communication 
of a Fidesz policy. Then the opposition finally found the energy to do 
something different, to do it together, and to energise thousands 
of youth to protest each night in the freezing cold for weeks. These 
were the weeks that forged the opposition into the unity that paved 
the way for its first major political success since 2010, the municipal 
elections of October 2019. It may be true that electoral coordination 
would have likely commenced anyway, but as it happened the 
immediate catalyst was the Slave Law. Apart from forging personal 
bonds between previously antagonistic opposition politicians who 
camped out in the public media building for days, it also provided a 
good excuse for bringing them together: their rage was directed at 
the plight of the common folk. 
Such type of energy is not likely to come out of the arcane rules 
governing whom independent MPs can caucus with and what type of 
parliamentary groups may or may not be formed, even though these 
issues are clearly of vital importance to the primary challenge facing 
the opposition in Hungary, namely electoral coordination and then 
parliamentary cooperation. Similarly, it is hard to imagine thousands 
of youths railing against the fact that the Constitutional Court will 
be recast as an appeals forum to override the Curia in cases that it 
otherwise could not even have heard. But there should be no mistake 
about this, the politicisation of the judiciary can have a decisive 
impact not only in general but also at vital and historically unique 
junctures, such as for example the arbitration of election results, a 
not at all unlikely scenario in Hungary. It bears keeping in mind that 
the point at which the prime minister called the Curia “intellectually 
unfit” for its responsibilities was precisely an election case ruling that 
was unfavourable for Fidesz in 2018.
The omnibus law adopted to subvert the judiciary, along with all the 
other seemingly innocent laws adopted in a rush at the end of 2019, 
point to a very distinctive feature of the regime. When future historians 
will retrace the steps that Viktor Orbán took to consolidate power in 
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Hungary, they will note that a surprisingly large portion was done by 
smart lawyering. As a case in point, consider how Fidesz changes the 
use of the local business tax that municipal governments depend on 
for a large chunk of their discretionary spending. All the amendment 
does is to say that rather than having to “pre-eminently” focus on 
funding public transportation, municipal governments will have to do 
so “primarily”. Again, it is hard to picture a mass demonstration with 
banners protesting this amendment, but it is still pure poison for local 
autonomy. 
Fidesz’s founding core are a bunch of law school students, and to 
some extent this is reflected in how they build a regime by deploying 
sophisticated legal mechanisms. None of this would be possible, 
of course, without a two-thirds majority, and Fidesz’s frequent 
violations of both the text and the spirit of existing laws suggest 
that it does not shrink back from more overtly authoritarian moves 
when it loses patience or when European regulations or norms do 
not permit changing the underlying statutes. We can expect this to 
continue in 2020, especially as Fidesz still wants money out of the 
EU and will try to present its least overtly authoritarian self, which 
works better with codification experts churning out tons of boring 
amendments than, for instance, government-sponsored skinheads 
blocking an opposition politician from filing a referendum question 
(as it happened in 2016). Moreover, it has the added benefit that it is 
less likely to get the public riled up. 
Nevertheless, Fidesz has thus far weaponised every conceivable 
instrument it could lay its hands on, and despite all the speculations 
that it would be reasonable – for the governing party’s own objectives, 
that is – to take a step back, it has kept intensifying its martial 
approach to politics every year since it has been in office. Whenever 
the expectation was that it would “moderate” the pace before fully 
hollowing out democracy, Viktor Orbán presented another piece of 
legislation that eroded a vital piece of the democratic structure and 
of the system of checks and balances. In this spirit, 2020 should 
also mark the year when the fumbling speculations about Fidesz’s 
“moderation” finally end, at both the Hungarian and European level, 
to be replaced by the better-late-than-never realisation that Fidesz’s 
policies are a fundamental threat to democracy in Hungary and 
Europe. 
For the opposition, 2019 brought two fundamental changes that 
seemed unattainable for almost a decade. The first, chronologically, 
was the ability to put aside petty personal and legitimate ideological 
differences, and to work together on the one goal that they have 
now all mutually recognised as the top priority in Hungary: stopping 
Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz before they complete an authoritarian 
regime that will become largely immune to a democratic challenge. 
While the differences in mentalities and ideologies, the frequent 
personal antipathies and the bad history between the players in the 
opposition still crop up often enough, by and large they have taken a 
backseat to their joint insight that given the inescapable logic of the 
electoral system and how Fidesz continues to tilt the playing field 
against them, nothing but unity can work. 
The other key change is hope, which was absent among all but a 
few highly dedicated activists. Now, for the time being, opposition 
politicians and, just as importantly, their voters, too, have hope. 
The most important source of that hope was the electoral success 
of October in the municipal election, when these parties, together 
with an energised base, managed to secure some very limited (and 
since shrinking) degree of autonomy by winning in many large urban 
municipalities in Hungary. 
Now comes the hard part of consolidating and expanding that 
support, for the positions won need to be both defended and 
expanded since they are by far not enough for a national election 
victory. Based on current polling data and the results of the municipal 
election, Fidesz would return with a comfortable majority in 2022, 
barring further shifts in public opinion. 
This leaves the opposition with several vital challenges as the next 
steps in building on their previous successes. First, they must use the 
municipalities they won to the maximum effect in showing that they 
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are not the incessantly bickering clowns as Fidesz tries to portray 
them to the voters. The opposition parties must prove that they 
are a competent and diverse crew that can steer the ship of several 
major municipalities and could hence be trusted to also pilot the 
national ship in the stormy seas of domestic challenges (education, 
healthcare, reducing inequality, diversification of the Hungarian 
economy, sustainable development, etc.) and global risks (climate 
change, migration, European integration, etc.). Doing good work in 
the municipalities that they have won is an essential condition, and 
corruption scandals and policy failures would make the opposition a 
perfect target for the government’s claims that an opposition that 
cannot properly manage towns should not be put in charge nationally. 
And while all this is ongoing, the opposition parties must devote 
massive energy to winning back parts of the rural base without 
which a national victory is simply mathematically unattainable. By 
whatever methods, building local media, canvassing or organisation 
building, among others, they must drive these points home to at least 
portions of the rural voters who may harbour reservations about the 
Fidesz government but see far too little evidence that it is time to 
jump ship into the great unknown that the opposition appears to 
stand for. This is a highly challenging enterprise, to say the least. But 
unless voters in rural areas perceive that there is an alternative to 
Fidesz, the opposition’s chances are rather limited. 
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